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Counterpossibles in Scientific Practice
Three Case Studies in support of Worldly Hyperintensionality
Abstract
Hyperintensionality  –  the  failure  of  substitutivity salva  veritate of  intensionally  equivalent
expressions  –  is  one  of  the  most  debated  topics  in  recent  philosophy  of  language.  Being  a
phenomenon that affects a wide variety of different sentential contexts, a question concerning its
source arises: is hyperintensionality something that can originate from actual features of the world,
or  it  is  simply  some  kind  of representational  phenomenon,  which  entirely  depends  on  our
conceptual faculties and preferred semantics? After a brief general introduction to the topic from the
semantic standpoint, in the present work I defend a view developed by Daniel Nolan, according to
which hyperintensionality can be a worldly, non-representational phenomenon. I first reconstruct
Nolan’s view and argument for worldly hyperintensionality,  understood through the comparison
with de re intensional modality. Then, I address the main criticism that has been raised against it,
developing  three  objections.  Evidence  for  worldly  hyperintensionality  is  thereby  presented,  by
focusing on a paradigmatic trigger: counterpossible conditionals. I provide two jointly sufficient
criteria for a counterpossible to be a genuine instance of worldly hyperintensionality, then illustrate
three case studies from scientific practices that all rely on counterpossible reasoning: reducibility in
relative computability theory; scientific explanation of certain substances’ essential properties; and
emergent molecular structure in chemistry. Each of them is evaluated by checking if it satisfies the
criteria  for  worldly  hyperintensionality,  leading  to  the  detection  of  patterns  of  counterpossible
dependence occurring in at least some specific instances of the case studies discussed. Finally, I
suggest  a possible realist  reading of such dependence relation,  locating its  relata in  the  world,
independently from our representations.
Keywords: hyperintensionality; counterpossibles; relative computability; scientific 
explanation; strong emergence; negative facts.
I. Introduction
1.1 Compositionality
Contemporary semantics heavily relies on set-theoretic machinery to account for essential
features of natural languages. Among them, compositionality is one of the most important.
Before  beginning  my  journey  through  the  formal  frameworks  and  their  philosophical
motivations that will constitute the basis of this work, I will briefly introduce this property,
together with a principle that will soon be recognized as fundamental for the upcoming
discussion. 
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In the literature we find different ways of understanding compositionality,  but a
rough characterization that will be suitable for the current purposes is the following:
(C) The meaning of a complex expression is determined by its structure and the
meanings of its constituents (Szabó 2017).
(C) is meant to capture, at least  prima facie, the huge amount of evidence we have for
semantic phenomena like productivity – our ability as competent speakers of potentially
understanding infinitely many complex expressions we never encountered before, just by
understanding the meaning of each of their parts – and systematicity – the fact that there are
definite  and  predictable  patterns  among the  expressions  we understand.  It  follows  that
every compositional language satisfies a rule, commonly known as substitution principle,
according to which: 
(SP) The substitution of a meaningful linguistic item occurring in a complex
expression with another item that has the same meaning, preserves the meaning
of the whole expression. 
An instance of such semantic preservation is the following:
(1) Anna talks
If one substitutes ‘talks’ in (1) with an expression that has the same meaning, for example
‘speaks’, the overall meaning of (1) does not change.
But what exactly is a meaning? According to standard accounts, the primary aspect
of  meaning  has  to  do  with  the  referents of  linguistic  items:  a  meaningful  linguistic
expression must, obviously, “pick out” something out there in the world. Then, the first step
towards a formal account of meaning amounts to find the right sort of entity that fits this
role, for each kind of basic linguistic expressions such as names, predicates and sentences.
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1.2 Extensionality
A first set-theoretic attempt in this direction that has its roots in Frege 1892, consists in
employing the notion of extension. Following Nolan 2019,
the extension of a name is its bearer, the extension of a predicate is the set of things
that the predicate applies to, and the extension of a sentence is its truth-value. [...] In
the simplest cases of subject–predicate sentences, the extension of the subject term and
the extension of the predicate together determine the extension (truth-value) of the
sentence: the sentence is true if the extension of the subject term is a member of the
extension  of  the  predicate,  and  false  otherwise.  (For  example,  if  the  extension  of
‘Peter’ is Peter and the extension of ‘is a rabbit’ is the set of rabbits, then ‘Peter is a
rabbit’ is true if, and only if, Peter is a member of the set of rabbits) (p. 1).
Within  this  framework  the  extensions  of  complex  sentences  are  truth-functions  of  the
extensions of simple sentences (sentences of the subject-predicate form) occurring in them:
the  truth-value  of  a  whole  sentence  is  fully  determined  by  the  truth-values  of  its
constituents, given a set of rules for the logical connectives.
By identifying the primary aspect of the meaning of a sentence with its truth-value,
we can easily notice how (SP), so far understood merely as an intuitive principle, can be
reinterpreted in a more rigorous way:
(SVE) Two expressions can always be inter-substituted  salva veritate if  and
only if they have the same extension.
Here is an example. On the assumption that I actually have ten fingers and ten toes, the
following sentence is true:
(2) The number of my fingers = 10
Since the extension of ‘the number of my fingers’ is the same of ‘the number of my toes’ –
namely,  the  number  10  –  we  can  substitute  the  former  with  the  latter  in  (2)  without
changing the truth-value of the resulting sentence:
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(2a) The number of my toes = 10
So far, so good. But is this enough to conclude that ‘the number of my fingers’ and ‘the
number of my toes’ have the same meaning? Even if, in actuality, they refer to the same
object, they seem to express different contents. Is truth preservation in extensional contexts
–  places  in  a  sentence  that  allow  for  substitution  according  to  (SVE)  –  sufficient  for
modeling synonymity? Something in this picture of meaning is still missing.
Besides a  prima facie intuition that two extensionally equivalent expressions can
differ  in  meaning,  what  can  go  wrong  if  we  limit  ourselves  to  a  purely  extensional
semantics? Consider the following sentence:
(3) 10 = 10
Since (3) is an identity statement, if it is true, it is necessarily so1:
(3a) It is necessary that 10 = 10
Now,  suppose  to  substitute  in  (3a)  the  first  occurrence  of  ‘10’ with  a  co-extensional
expression from the previous example, ‘the number of my fingers’:
(3b) It is necessary that the number of my fingers = 10
(3b) is obviously false2: for instance, I could have lost one of my fingers in an incident.
Another famous example of (SVE) failure, due to Quine 1951, involves predicates:
(4) It is necessary that all renates are renates
(4) is a straightforward conceptual truth. Now, since in the actual world ‘being a renate’ has
the same extension of ‘being a cordate’ (every animal with a heart has also a kidney and
1 The necessity of identity is a popular view in metaphysics that will be assumed here (see Kripke 1980).
2 Informally,  the  scope of  the necessity  operator  in  (3b)  is  the whole expression,  therefore  its default
reading is de dicto. The correspondent de re variant is typically written as ‘the number of my fingers is
necessarily 10’. See section 2.2 for a more detailed discussion.
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vice-versa), according to (SVE) the two expressions should always be inter-substitutable
salva veritate. However, by substituting an instance of ‘renates’ in (4) with ‘cordates’, one
gets:
(4a) It is necessary that all renates are cordates
But there could have been renates that are not cordates. So,  (4a) turns out to be false,
despite the truth of (4). It seems that even if the predicates ‘renate’ and ‘cordate’ have the
same extension, they still express different properties.
1.3 Intensionality
I  showed how easily  one  can  find  counterexamples  to  (SVE),  namely,  cases  in  which
substitution  salva veritate  of co-extensional expressions fails. Is the project of modeling
compositionality doomed? The answer is pretty obvious: it is doomed, as long as one only
focuses on the extensional aspect of meaning. But, as already noticed, there is a lot more to
say about it. For instance, intuition suggests that the meaning of an expression should not
depend merely on how the world  actually is, but also on  how it could have been. What
happens  in  cases  like  (3b)  and  (4a)  is  that  the  presence  of  the  modal  operator  ‘it  is
necessary  that’ creates  opaque  contexts  in  which  truth  preservation  requires  something
stronger than mere extensional equivalence. 
The notion of  intension has been introduced precisely for this purpose. As Nolan
points out, «the intension of a piece of language is traditionally thought to be an aspect of
the meaning of that language which goes together with how the world is to determine the
extension of the piece of language» (p. 1). Intensional accounts try to fully capture the
identification of the meaning of a sentence with its truth-conditions, namely, the conditions
under  which it  is  true.  The seminal  idea behind this  view is  commonly traced back to
Wittgenstein’s Tractatus, in which it is claimed that in order to understand a sentence one
must know what is the case in the world if that sentence is true. In the very same passage –
proposition 4.024 –, Wittgenstein also points out that one understands a sentence if one
understands its constituents; in other words, that language is compositional. 
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What are intensions then? For basic categories (names, predicates and sentences),
intensions are generally defined as functions from possible situations – commonly labeled
as  possible  worlds –   to  extensions:  the  intension  of  a  predicate,  i.e.  the  property  it
expresses, can be identified with the set of all objects that it applies to (not merely actual
ones), and the intension of a sentence with the set of possible worlds in which it is true. At
least since Kripke 1980, proper names, along with demonstratives, indexicals and natural
kinds are typically taken to be rigid designators: expressions that refer directly to the same
object in every possible world3.
Possible  worlds are  ways in  which things could be or have been and were first
introduced  to  ground the  truth  of  modal  statements  like  (3a).  From a  purely  semantic
perspective,  the  formal  device  that  captures  the  idea  of  a  possible  world  is  that  of  a
maximally complete and consistent set of sentences: for every world w and every sentence
p, either  p  is true in  w or  it  is false. According to the framework of standard Possible
Worlds Semantics (PWS), a sentence is necessarily true if and only if it is true in every
possible world, and it is possibly true if and only if it is true in some world.
Such modal operators behave like quantifiers over worlds, and, as already noticed,
give rise to peculiar sentential contexts that require more than simple co-extensionality to
warrant truth preservation. These are commonly called intensional contexts (as opposed to
extensional ones), because substitution salva veritate within them requires at least identity
of intension. Given this picture, a corresponding substitution principle can be expressed:
(SVI) Two expressions can always be inter-substituted salva veritate if and only
if they have the same intension.
Subscribing to this new framework enables to understand what went wrong in the previous
examples: they simply did not satisfy the correct substitution principle, (SVI). Let us see it
at work.
3 Both the rigidity thesis and the notion of possible world have generated a huge amount of literature that
encompasses almost every discipline within analytic philosophy, and the debate around them is still going
on nowadays. In the present work I will not focus on the epistemic and metaphysical issues concerning
them, but  I  will  assume the rigidity  thesis and take an ontologically neutral  stance towards possible
worlds semantics.
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Consider two names that actually refer to the same individual: ‘Brian Hugh Warner’
and ‘Marilyn  Manson’.  Assuming the rigidity  of  proper  names,  they  refer  to  the same
individual in every possible world.
(5) It is necessary that Marilyn Manson is Marilyn Manson
(5) is both conceptually and metaphysically true (it is true both on a de dicto and on a de re
reading),  therefore,  by  substituting  the  first  instance  of  ‘Marilyn  Manson’ with  the
intensionally equivalent expression ‘Brian Hugh Warner’,  one gets:
(5a) It is necessary that Brian Hugh Warner is Marilyn Manson
which is also true. Through the adoption of an intensional account, it seems possible to
associate  each  linguistic  expression  with  the  appropriate  function  that  allows  for
substitution salva veritate, also within the scope of modal operators.
Now,  one  may  ask  if  sameness  of  meaning  is  fully  captured  by  sameness  of
intension: is satisfying (SVI) sufficient for two expressions to be synonyms? If that is the
case, (PWS) would provide a full and elegant account of compositionality. But what about
cases like the following:
(6) Anna believes that Marilyn Manson is a great singer
Suppose that (6) is  true,  yet  Anna does not  know that Marilyn Manson is  Brian Hugh
Warner. Now, by operating the same substitution saw in the previous example, one gets:
(6a) Anna believes that Brian Hugh Warner is a great singer
which is false. The same arguably happens with any other intentional concept like hope,
fear, desire, knowledge, and so on, even without appealing to the rigidity of proper names.
Suppose it is true that:
9
(7) Anna knows that 2+2=4
All  mathematical  truths,  being  true  in  the  same  possible  worlds  (all  of  them),  are
intensionally equivalent. Consider now a less friendly mathematical truth like 9!=362880.
According to (SVI), it is possible to substitute it with ‘2+2=4’ in (7) salva veritate:
(7a) Anna knows that 9!=362880
But suppose that Anna does not actually know that 9!=362880. Then, the inference from (7)
to (7a)  would be illegitimate, even  though (SVI) allows it. This generalizes to  any other
necessary  truth:  in  a  standard  intensional  framework  it  is  sufficient  to  know  a  single
necessary truth, no matter how trivial, for knowing every necessary truth as well4.
Apparently,  substitution  salva  veritate of  co-intensional  expressions  within
representational  contexts  –  places  in  a  sentence  created  by  the  presence  of  verbs  for
intentional mental states – can fail. Now, either propositional attitude reports like (6) are
non-compositional, or (SVI)-based semantics like (PWS) lack expressive power. But why
should one consider sentences like (6) non-compositional? Is the failure of (SVI) in such
cases  sufficient  for  rejecting  compositionality  altogether?  Epistemically,  they  behave
exactly like the others discussed so far.  Suppose that I  never  encountered (6) before.  I
would still be able to understand it as long as I could grasp the meaning of each of its
constituents (i.e. ‘Anna’, ‘believing’, ‘Marilyn Manson’, ‘being a good singer’). In other
words, sentences like (6) seem to comply with the productivity of natural language, and
productivity entails compositionality. Denying this would require to provide a non-ad hoc
explanation of alternative mechanisms by means of which one understands expressions like
(6). Furthermore, as will be explored in detail later, (SVI) seems to fail also with sentences
that do not contain any kind of propositional attitude verb. In other words, it can fail also
with  sentences  that  have  as  constituents  only  pieces  of  language that  typically  behave
compositionally.
4 This phenomenon is an instance of the more general problem of logical omniscience (see Rendsvig and
Rasmus 2021).
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Given  these  remarks,  it  seems  more  reasonable  to  conclude  that  (SVI)  is  not
sufficient  as  a  basic  principle  to  account  for  compositionality,  instead  of  rejecting
compositionality altogether in problematic cases.
1.4 Representational hyperintensionality
At a first glance, the problem of finding an alternative to (SVI) and to standard intensional
semantics is the problem of finding a formal device for representing meanings that do not
collapse  the  distinction  between  necessary  equivalents.  In  other  words,  we  need  a
principled  way  of  delivering  the  appropriate  semantic  fineness  of  grain for  blocking
inferences  like that  from (6)  to  (6a),  while  retaining all  of  the substitutional  properties
associated with compositional languages. This constitutes the core of the issues concerning
what is nowadays called hyperintensionality. 
The  most  common  way  of  framing  the  problem  in  the  literature  focuses  on
hyperintensional contexts, of which those created by propositional attitudes, as previously
seen, are a prominent example. Hyperintensional contexts are places in a sentence in which
(SVI)  fails.  To  put  it  in  a  more  rigorous  way,  a  place  in  a  sentence  is  said  to  be
hyperintensional if and only if it does not always allow substitution  salva veritate of co-
intensional expressions.
What  about  the  entities  that  should  warrant  substitution  salva  veritate in
hyperintensional contexts? As Nolan 2019 notices, 
it is less common to talk about an expression’s ‘hyperintension’ than it is to talk about
its  extension  or  intension.  Presumably  the  hyperintension  of  an  expression  would
determine  how it  behaved in  hyperintensional  contexts  as  well  as  extensional  and
merely intensional ones, and how it contributed to the truth-conditions of any sentence
in which it appeared (p. 3).
Needless to say, a corresponding substitution principle that should capture the appropriate
fineness of grain for drawing hyperintensional distinctions would sound like this:
(SVH) Two expressions can always be inter-substituted  salva veritate if  and
only if they have the same hyperintension.
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In order to comply with (SVH) and assess its suitability, one should first find a precise
definition  of  hyperintension:  something  far  from being  an  easy  task.  Furthermore,  the
problem of hyperintensionality appears to be at least twofold: it is not simply that of finding
a way of making distinctions between semantic contents that are not too coarse-grained, but
also that of finding a way of making distinctions that are  not too fine-grained. This is
known as the granularity problem, or the problem of “how hyper” hyperintensions should
be. Borrowing Berto and Nolan 2021 words,
a hyperintensional account of this or that notion shouldn’t make it as fine-grained as
the syntax of the language one is working with—on pain of giving away the very point
of  having  a  semantics  for  it.  Propositions  may  be  more  fine-grained  than  sets  of
possible worlds, but they had better not be mappable 1:1 to the sentences expressing
them.
To better understand this point, look at one of the most ambitious historical attempts to
model semantic distinctions: Lewisian semantic trees.
Lewis 1970 claims that meanings are to be identified with peculiar structures built
out  of  intensions,  which  are  able  to  cut  more  fine-grained  distinctions  between  co-
intensional expressions. Such devices are semantic trees, namely functions that impose a
hierarchy on sets that mirrors the internal structure of meaningful expressions. Formally, «a
partial order with a unique maximum element, x0, such that for any element, xn, there is a
unique finite chain of elements xn ≤ xn−1 ≤ ... ≤ x1 ≤ x0» (Priest 2012, p. 6). Hence, according
to this picture meanings are semantically interpreted trees, having at each of their nodes an
ordered pair in which the first member is a category – entities like names, predicates and
sentences – and the second one is an appropriate intension for that category. 
Within this framework, it is possible to account for the difference between sentences
like:
(8) If the sky is blue then the sky is blue
(9) Grass is green or grass is not green
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(8)  and  (9)  are  both  tautologies,  therefore,  assuming  classical  truth  conditions  for  the
disjunction and the conditional, they are true in exactly the same circumstances: all possible
ones. In other words, they are co-intensional. But if meanings are semantic trees, then a
difference between any node of the trees representing (8) and (9) amounts to a difference in
their meaning, regardless of their intensions (where the intension of a whole tree is identical
with  the  intension  of  its  root,  i.e.  the  top  node  representing  the  whole  expression).
Sameness  of  meaning  entails  sameness  of  intension,  but  sameness  of  intension  is
compatible  with distinction in  meaning.  So,  Lewis’ trees  seem to  be able  to  draw this
specific kind of hyperintensional distinctions. But what about sentences like:
(10) Grass is green.
(11) It is not the case that grass is not green.
One can easily notice that (11) is the double negation of (10). Thus, they have the same
truth conditions5. Do they have the same meaning? Intuitively, the answer is yes. (10) and
(11) do not simply share their intensions, but also their subject matter: they are both about
‘the color of the grass’. Nevertheless, according to Lewis’ account (10) and (11) would
differ in meaning: two different trees are needed to represent a sentence and to represent its
double  negation,  so  there  cannot  be  identity  between  their  meanings.  Then,  as  Lewis
himself recognizes, semantic trees seem to cut meanings too finely, but he quickly dismiss
the issue by saying:
this  difficulty  does  not  worry  me:  we  will  have  both  intensions  and  what  I  call
meanings,  and  sometimes  one  and  sometimes  the  other  will  be  preferable  as  an
explication  of  our  ordinary  discourse  about  meanings.  Perhaps  some  entities  of
intermediate fineness can also be found, but I doubt that there is any uniquely natural
way to do so (p. 32).
Was Lewis’ pessimism justified?  Nowadays  hyperintensional  talk  is  widespread  across
several areas of philosophical inquiry,  so the need for rigorous ways of dealing with it
resulted in the development of a variety of formal frameworks that account for more or less
specific instances of it. 
5 Unless one subscribes to  some form of intuitionism, which rejects the classical rule of double negation
elimination (see Moschovakis 2018).
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So far I have provided a general introduction of the topic, which could not have
been approached without making reference to some intuitive semantic principles. As we
have just seen, the task of finding an appropriate formal framework to account for them is
currently  one  of  the  most  difficult  and debated  in  philosophy.  But  regardless  of  one’s
semantic  preferences,  in  the present  work I  want  to  focus  on a  side-issue  that  has  yet
received relatively little attention: the problem of  the source of hyperintensionality. The
hyperintensionality of the cases discussed in section 1.3 seems to depend entirely on the
way  in  which  some  agent  represent  certain  contents.  We  can  label  them  as  cases  of
representational hyperintensionality. But what if hyperintensionality could depend also on
how the  world  is  like,  independently  of  our  ways of  representing  it? In the  following
chapters I will explore this hypothesis by focusing on a peculiar class of hyperintensional




2.1 Hyperintensional contexts without propositional attitudes
There  are  at  least  two  distinct  ways  of  understanding  non-representational
hyperintensionality.  The  first  and  weaker  sense  is simply  a  label  for  the  set of  those
hyperintensional  contexts  triggered  by  something  different  than  a  sentential  operator
standing for a propositional attitude like belief, desire, hope, fear and so on. The second and
stronger sense is what Nolan 2014 calls worldly hyperintensionality, which is based on the
idea that «we need hyperintensional resources to adequately represent features of the world
independent  of  us,  and  not  merely  to  understand  and  explain  our  representing of  that
world» (p. 2). I will try to clarify Nolan’s position in section 2.2; in the current section, I
will illustrate some of the most discussed cases of non-representational hyperintensionality
in the weaker sense.
Recent  years  have  witnessed  a  constantly  growing  amount  of  evidence  for
hyperintensional  contexts  that  apparently  arise  independently  from  any  direct
representational  constraint.  The  property  of  being  knowable  a  priori displays
hyperintensional  features even without  explicit  ascriptions  of knowledge to  a  particular
agent. Consider this classic example:
(12) It is a priori that water is water
‘water is water’, arguably just like any other expressible tautology, is knowable  a priori,
therefore  (12)  is  true.  We  know  that  water  is  H2O  and,  following  Kripke,  that  it  is
necessarily so6. This means that ‘water’ and ‘H2O’ are intensionally equivalent. But if one
substitutes an instance of the former with the latter in (12), the resulting sentence is:
(12a) It is a priori that water is H2O
6 It is important to notice that one can resist the inference by rejecting the kripkean notion of a posteriori
necessity (see Kripke 1980).
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which  seems  false:  the  identity  between  water  and  H2O  is  something  that  must  be
discovered through experience, therefore it is not possible to know it a priori.
The property of being informative seems to display the same feature. To see this,
consider a false statement like:
(13) It is informative that water is water
By applying the same substitution of the previous example, one gets:
(13a) It is informative that water is H2O
which is arguably true.
Yet,  one  might  still  be  tempted  to  treat  this  kind  of  hyperintensionality  as  a
representational  phenomenon,  since  the  property  of  being  a  priori has  to  do  with  the
blatantly  epistemic  notion  of  knowability,  and  knowledge  is  a  propositional  attitude.
Likewise, one might argue that the property of being informative cannot be ascribed to a
proposition without indexing it to a particular agent or group of agents: something cannot
be informative or uninformative simpliciter, but only with respect to some agent.
However,  there  are  cases  of  hyperintensionality  in  which  no  implicit  epistemic
notion seems to be involved. Several hyperintensional distinctions manifest at a superficial
semantic level, even without the need of substitutions that are not truth-preserving. This has
already been partially shown by discussing Lewis in the previous chapter, but it is worth to
notice  that  something  analogous  happens  with  distinctions  between  impossibilities
(necessary falsehoods):
(14) The grass is green and it is not the case that the grass is green
(15) The sky is blue and it is not the case that the sky is blue
The intuitive difference in meaning between (14) and (15),  due to a difference in their
subject matter – the former is about the color of the grass, while the latter is about the color
of the sky – cannot be accounted for in intensional terms7. Intensionally, they are true in
7 See Yablo 2014 for a hyperintensional theory of subject matter.
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exactly the same worlds (none of them), so they are both identified with the null set,  just
like any other contradiction.
Finally, conditionals seem to display hyperintensional features as well. Consider the
following sentences:
(17) If Hesperus is not Phosphorus, then Hesperus is not Phosphorus
(17a) If Hesperus is not Phosphorus, then Hesperus is not Hesperus
Since ‘Hesperus’ and ‘Phosphorus’ are intensionally equivalent, (17) and (17a) should be
both true. However, one might want to maintain that the former is true, while the latter is
false8.  Something  analogous  happens  with  the  infamous  paradoxes  of  the  material
conditional and of the strict conditional, in which the supposed logical relation between the
antecedent and the consequent seems to be irrelevant for the intuitive truth-value of the
whole conditional9. One of the most interesting and discussed cases, that of counterpossible
conditionals, will be explored in detail in chapter 3.
The source of hyperintensionality in these cases is less clear. Even if they do not
involve  neither  explicit  representational  attitudes  nor  implicit  epistemic  notions,  they
ultimately seem to depend on our semantic intuitions.  This lead authors like Berto and
Nolan to locate them in the representational realm10. In the next section, I will introduce the
concept  of  worldly  hyperintensionality,  namely  hyperintensionality  triggered  by  wholly
non-representational phenomena.
2.2 Worldly hyperintensionality
Nolan  2014  acknowledges  the  conspicuous  amount  of  data  for  non-representational
hyperintensionality  and moves  a  step  forward.  The author’s  original  insight  is  that  we
should  not  consider  hyperintensionality  simply  as  a  semantic  or  representational
phenomenon which manifests at the level of language (regardless of whether the subject
8 See Jago 2014 for a detailed discussion.
9 See Berto and Nolan 2021.
10 Ibidem.
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matter  of  a  sentence  is  non-representational),  but  also  as  a  real,  worldly  phenomenon
largely independent from our conceptual faculties. 
He begins  by extending the  applicability  of  hyperintensional  talk to  phenomena
outside of the field of language: in his view, it is not enough to say that a phenomenon is
hyperintensional on the basis of the fact that the words we use for talking of it occupy a
hyperintensional position. A better way of classifying phenomena consists in detecting a
principled need for a certain kind of expressive resources to explain them. For instance, de
re modal properties systematically require intensional language to be accounted for, while
propositional attitudes like belief need something more fine-grained. The shift is then from
the linguistic phenomena to the phenomena that the language captures, and a rough picture
of their classification is the following:
Running might then count as an extensional phenomena [sic], if we think an account of
running can be adequate if it only mentions actual arrangements of legs and bodies.
Necessity  would  then  naturally  be  classified  as  an  intensional  phenomena  [sic],
needing expressions like “necessarily”, that create intensional positions, to capture it.
Belief might naturally be classified as a hyperintensional phenomena [sic], needing an
expression like “believes that...” to adequately capture it. Most theories of phenomena
will consist of a variety of sentences, so if we want to assign each phenomenon one
label  from “extensional”,  “intensional”  and “hyperintensional”,  it  might  be  best  to
assign  “hyperintensional”  if  hyperintensional  language  is  needed  to  capture  a
phenomenon, “intensional” if intensional but not hyperintensional language is needed,
and “extensional” only if no intensional nor hyperintensional language is needed (p. 4).
A first matter of potential controversy with this method of classification is addressed by the
author. On the one hand, one might believe that an alleged extensional phenomenon like
running is actually intensional, or even hyperintensional, on a more careful reading. On the
other hand, one might argue that necessity can be accomodated in a purely extensional
language, for instance by means of quantification over worlds. However, as remarked later
in  the  paper,  even  if  a  fully  extensional  language  for  intensional  or  hyperintensional
phenomena  is  actually  available,  this  would  not  threaten  the  idea  that  the phenomena
themselves are intensional or hyperintensional, just like the fact that we can offer a theory
of possible worlds in an extensional language does not undermine the idea that possible
worlds themselves are intensional entities. Nevertheless, as we will see in section 2.3, one
could reject the very idea of worldly hyperintensional phenomena even while accepting that
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a language contains hyperintensional  positions  occupied by non-representational subject
matters.
Now, the idea that some non-representational properties can be explained away by
treating  them  as  properties  of  pieces  of  language  instead  of  properties  of  the  objects
denoted by them is not new in the history of philosophy. Nolan mentions the extensionalist
reaction  to  the  so-called intensional  revolution that  took  place  in  analytic  philosophy
between the 1960s and 1980s: in this flourishing era of new powerful formal devices like
possible worlds and the wide range of modal notions employed across almost every field of
philosophical inquiry, many were those unwilling to take intensionality seriously outside
the  merely  linguistic  domain.  For  instance,  a  common  strategy  adopted  by  prominent
extensionalists like Davidson and Quine consisted in paraphrasing intensional concepts by
mentioning them in quotation, in order to reinterpret modality as a predicate of sentences,
or propositional attitudes as relations between people and sentences. This allowed them to
read intensional phenomena as if they were all about representations. According to such
extensionalists, when we say that I contingently have ten fingers, we are not stating a fact
about a non-representational object. What we are really doing is expressing a property of a
sentence: “‘I have ten fingers’ is contingent”. In other words, there was no place for de re
modality in the extensionalist picture. Nowadays, this would constitute a rather unorthodox
view, as Nolan points out: «while extensionalism still has some adherents, I think it is fair
to say that most philosophers working on necessity,  belief  etc.  find these extensionalist
maneuvers clumsy, inadequate to the data, and philosophically perverse» (p. 7).
A similar  kind  of  resistance,  this  time  on  intensionalist  grounds,  exists  today
towards certain kinds of hyperintensional contexts, as will be explored in detail later for the
case of counterpossible conditionals. Nevertheless, the need for expressive resources able
to  draw  fine-grained  distinctions  between  intensionally  equivalent  contents  is  widely
recognized. What is more controversial is the view that hyperintensionality can be due also
to the world rather than just to our representations of the world. According to Nolan, the
source of the difficulty in accepting this idea is to be found in the common characteristics
of the most famous cases of hyperintensionality. As already underlined, even the cases of
weaker  non-representational  hyperintensionality  can  be  indirectly  traced  back  to  our
representations or conceptual faculties. Besides the obvious cases like intentional mental
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states denoted by propositional attitude reports, it is always possible to develop arguments
for the conceptual nature of synonymity, truth according to fictions or even according to
semantics  and epistemology,  as  we saw with the properties  of  being  a priori or  being
informative. If such contexts exhausted the whole range of hyperintensional phenomena,
this would be enough to conclude that hyperintensionality is essentially a representational
matter.  The  fact  that  we  need  hyperintensional  positions  in  our  languages  could  be
explained with our inability to have perfect access to all of the intensions associated with
each  piece  of  language  and  its  corresponding  representational  content  in  our  minds.
Another  reason  why  one  might  be  tempted  to  consider  hyperintensionality  as  merely
representational is that one’s favorite theory for analyzing hyperintensionality makes use of
representational  entities  only.  This  is  similar  to  the  strategy  adopted  by  Byrne  and
Thompson in opposing Nolan’s view, as we shall see in the next section. 
But the crucial passage is that, according to Nolan, the above mentioned examples
are only a subset of the whole range of hyperintensional phenomena.
I want to suggest here that hyperintensionality is needed for an adequate account of the
non-representational world as well. In suggesting this, I do not mean to be disputing
the  truism  that,  in  one  sense,  we  need  representations  for  hyperintensionality.
Hyperintensional positions were defined in terms of substitution instances and truth-
preservation  under  substitutions,  and  so  is  a  criterion  that  applies  only  to
representations.  Nor  do  I  mean  the  relatively  innocuous  claim  that  sentences  that
contain hyperintensional positions are sometimes about the non-representational world,
and are  sometimes not  synonymous  with  non-hyperintensional  sentences  about  the
same subject matter (p. 10).
Hence, Nolan’s intuition seems to be that hyperintensionality can be involved with non-
representational  content  also  at  a  deeper  level  than  that  of  linguistic  subject  matter:
hyperintensionality can be a worldly phenomenon independent from our representations.
But what evidence do we have for this? According to Nolan, a first indicator is the fact that
we often require hyperintensional explanations for worldly phenomena that do not depend
at all on our representations of them: «if we find ourselves appealing to hyperintensional
distinctions in our theory of non-representational matters, that would be good evidence that
hyperintensional phenomena are not just representational» (p. 10).
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The  author  then  proceeds  to  enumerate  some  of  the  main  examples  of
hyperintensional  explanations  within  the  field  of  metaphysics11.  Since  metaphysics  is
supposed to be the inquiry on the ultimate structure and nature of reality, and the subject
matters  of  metaphysical  theories  are  typically  non-representational,  to  show that  some
fundamental features of reality require hyperintensional explanations amounts to provide
genuine evidence for the claim that hyperintensionality can be due to the world.
The  first  example  mentioned  by  Nolan  is  counterpossibles  –  counterfactual
conditionals with a necessarily false antecedent –, that I will explore in detail in the next
chapter. Next, we have explanation itself: as long as we take it as a relation between states
of affairs (which are worldly entities), as many do, in claims like: 
(E) It is true that grass is green because grass is green
the  explanans and the  explanandum are necessarily equivalent (necessarily, it is true that
grass is green if and only if grass is green), but the relation captured by ‘because’ goes only
in one direction12. Of course, one might raise a worry concerning explanation similar to that
discussed in section 2.1 concerning other epistemic notions. However, according to Nolan it
is sufficient to point out that those who already accepted that explanation can be a worldly
matter have reasons to posit worldly hyperintensionality here. 
Regardless of one’s opinion on this specific issue, there seems to be cases in which
the absence of representational mediation is less controversial. Nolan mentions the debate
on  essences,  in  which it  has  been argued that  a  merely  modal  (intensional)  account  is
insufficient  to  draw  the  appropriate  distinctions13,  and  this  might  also  generalize  to
properties as a whole (triangularity and trilaterality necessarily apply to the same objects,
but they seem to be different properties). This includes the ways of classifying the various
kinds of properties, like  intrinsicality, in which the traditional modal accounts have been
contrasted  with  a  number  of  counterexamples14 and  even  positive  arguments  for  its
hyperintensionality15.  Furthermore,  one of the most flourishing topics in metaphysics of
11 See Nolan 1997 for a discussion on the necessary nature of metaphysical claims.
12 See Schneider 2011.
13 See Fine 1994.
14 See Dunn 1990.
15 See Eddon 2011.
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recent years is metaphysical grounding, i.e. a non-causal relation of ontological dependence
between  objects,  properties  or  states  of  affairs.  Despite  its  being  a  matter  of  huge
disagreement, there is a widespread consensus regarding its hyperintensionality. A classical
example is the following:
(G) The existence of Socrates grounds the existence of {Socrates} 
{Socrates}  is  Socrates’ singleton,  i.e.  the  set  containing  Socrates  as  its  only  member.
Apparently, {Socrates} and Socrates are co-intensional, but if we switch the former with
the  latter  in  (G),  we get  a  false  statement:  it  seems that  {Socrates}  exists  in  virtue  of
Socrates’ existence and not the other way around.
Finally,  Nolan  himself  developed  arguments  for  the  view that  some disposition
ascriptions  are  hyperintensional:  objects  can  have  non-trivial  impossible  dispositional
properties, i.e. properties that would manifest only in impossible circumstances16. Consider
the following:
(ID) Anna is disposed to be surprised if she sees a round square
(IDa) Anna is not disposed to be surprised if she sees a round square
Since the stimulus condition – the sight of a round square – for the manifestation of the
disposition is metaphysically impossible, (ID) and (IDa) are supposed to express the same
proposition (the null set), hence they should have the same truth value. However, we have a
strong intuition that the former would be true while the latter would be false. In sum, as
Berto  and  Nolan  2021  remark:  «almost  any  area  of  metaphysics  where  necessity  or
counterfactuals have played a role is a candidate for hyperintensional approaches».
However, the shift from the language to the world might still raise some perplexity.
All of the just sketched cases have in common the fact of being about non-representational
matters and of requiring hyperintensional resources to account for them, but this does not
suffice for concluding that hyperintensionality itself is something arising from the world
rather than from our representations of it. After all, hyperintensionality has been defined in
linguistic terms, theories are ultimately linguistic items and Nolan writes that allowing for
16 See Jenkins and Nolan 2012.
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hyperintensional contexts with non-representational subject matters is relatively innocuous.
How  does  this  justify  to  locate  the  source  of  hyperintensionality  outside  the  field  of
language? On the face of it, I believe that it is simply the most natural way to read certain
instances  of  hyperintensionality.  The  author’s  comparison  with  intensionality  is
appropriate: just like the natural way of reading intensional modality is often the  de re
interpretation (otherwise, we would need to resort to dubious paraphrases), the same is true
for certain hyperintensional statements. To better understand this point, look at how we
ordinarily treat ambiguous intensional cases. Consider the following:
(P) Every poor is necessarily poor17
We have two different ways of reading (P). On a de re interpretation, it says:
(Pr) x(poor(x)→□poor(x))∀
namely, that every poor is such that he or she is necessarily so (he or she possesses the
property of being poor essentially),  making (P) obviously false.  Hence,  the natural  and
correct reading seems to be de dicto, according to which (P) says:
(Pd) □ x(poor(x)→poor(x))∀
Here, the scope of the modal operator includes the whole expression contained within the
scope of the universal quantifier, therefore (Pd) ascribes a modal property to the expression
‘every poor is  poor’,  which is  a  necessary conceptual  truth.  On the other hand, take a
sentence like:
(F) The number of my fingers is necessarily even
On a de dicto interpretation, (F) would say:
17 The example is from Casalegno 1997.
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(Fd)  □ x(the  number  of  my  fingers(x) y(the  number  of  my  ∃ ∧∀
fingers(y)→y=x) even(x))∧
namely, that I necessarily have the property of having an even number of fingers, which is
clearly false. So, in this case the natural reading (on the assumption that I actually have ten
fingers) should be de re:
(Fr)  x(the  number  of  my  fingers(x) y(the  number  of  my  ∃ ∧∀
fingers(y)→y=x) □even(x))∧
according to which the object denoted by ‘the number of my fingers’ in the actual world –
i.e.  the  number  10  –  is  necessarily  even. Apparently,  some  statements  are  intensional
because they capture features that the world possess intrinsically, not because we represent
them intensionally.
Likewise, some statements are hyperintensional because they capture features that
the world possesses intrinsically, not because we represent them hyperintensionally. Just
like it would be implausible to say that it is true that I contingently have ten fingers because
the sentence ‘I have ten fingers’ has the property of being contingent, it would be equally
implausible to say that {Socrates}’s existence is grounded on Socrates’ existence because
the  grounding  relation  behave  semantically like  that,  or  because  we  are  unable  to
conceptualize  it  otherwise.  Notice  that  in  this  last  case  the  subject  matter  is  non-
representational and the two  relata behave hyperintensionally,  but the relation seems to
hold regardless of our representational faculties or preferred semantics.
Now, despite the strong intuitions towards this reading within metaphysics, Nolan
does not make a clear statement of what he believes to be the sufficient and necessary
conditions for worldly hyperintensionality. However, I think that it is possible to follow its
guiding principle of looking for hyperintensional explanations (especially those that rely
less on intuition than metaphysical ones, like scientific explanations) in order to reconstruct
some criteria for making the idea of at least one kind of worldly hyperintensionality more
clear, as I will discuss in chapter 3. 
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In the following section I will explore the main criticism that has been put forward
against the idea that hyperintensionality can be something that originates from the world,
and in the next chapter I will illustrate three case studies for defending its plausibility from
outside the field of metaphysics.
2.3 Against worldly hyperintensionality
Byrne  and  Thompson  2019  criticize  Nolan’s  idea  of  worldly  hyperintensionality  on
conceptualist grounds. More precisely, even if they accept the view that hyperintensional
language  is  needed  to  accurately  describe  the  world,  they  reject  the  idea  that
hyperintensionality  can  be  a  genuine  non-representational  phenomenon:
«hyperintensionality derives from features of representations» (p. 153).
They begin by sketching a Fregean picture of representational hyperintensionality
analogous to one that,  they argue,  is  possible to be employed for analyzing intensional
notions. Fregean accounts maintain that linguistic expressions – at least those embedded in
intensional contexts – do not refer directly to worldly entities such as objects, properties
and states of affairs. Instead, reference is mediated by the senses, or modes of presentation
of  the  objects  denoted  by  the  linguistic  expressions18.  Hence,  what  speakers  actually
express is not the denotation of a linguistic expression – a worldly object independent of
our representational faculties –, but a way in which we conceptualize such denotation: a
kind of representation. In other words, meanings are identified with senses. It is important
to notice that in the paper we do not find neither a full  Fregean semantics, nor even a
principled  way for  building  a  rough formal  framework.  Instead,  the  authors  choose  to
provide some examples to defend their suggestion.
To see their strategy at work, consider a pair of sentences from the previous chapter:
(3a) It is necessary that 10=10
(3b) It is necessary that the number of my fingers = 10
18 Explaining what sort of entity Fregean senses are supposed to be, metaphysically speaking, is one of the
toughest issues that a defender of such view must face; the authors avoid this specific point.
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The difference in meaning (and the corresponding difference in truth value) between (3a)
and (3b) does not depend on the denotation of ‘10’ and that of ‘the number of my fingers’ –
i.e. the number 10 –, which is contingently the same. Rather, it depends on the fact that they
express different senses, and obviously, the typical Fregean view is that substitution salva
veritate of expressions with different senses can fail.
According  to  Byrne  and  Thompson,  the  same  happens  with  regular  cases  of
representational  hyperintensionality,  such  as  those  triggered  by  propositional  attitudes.
From a  Fregean  perspective,  propositional  attitudes  are  relations  that  agents  bear  with
senses. Therefore, pairs of sentences like:
(6) Anna believes that Marilyn Manson is a great singer
(6a) Anna believes that Brian Hugh Warner is a great singer
once again differ in truth value because Anna bears a relation with two different senses,
even if the objects to which the senses refer are necessarily the same: for her, ‘Marilyn
Manson’ and ‘Brian Hugh Warner’ are associated with different descriptions, and this is
enough to explain their semantic difference at the hyperintensional level.
With this in mind, the authors proceed to summarize Nolan’s core argument in the
form of a conditional:
(N) If a subject-matter is not representational, then we cannot explain the fact
that we need hyperintensional idioms to describe and explain it in conceptualist
terms.
Their second step is to compare (N) with its intensional counterpart:
(M) If a subject-matter is not representational, then we cannot explain the fact
that  we  need  intensional  idioms  to  describe  and  explain  it  in  conceptualist
terms.
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Finally, they claim that if (M) can be successfully rejected, there is no reason to think that
the same cannot be done with (N). Since «a Fregean analysis of the non-representational
intensional operator per excellence [i.e. necessity] is well-known» (p. 156), they take a case
involving necessity like (3a) vs (3b), read in a conceptualist fashion, as evidence for the
possibility of rejecting (M). More precisely, they argue that what a sentence like (3a) says is
that a certain sense has the property of being necessary, therefore it cannot guarantee truth
preservation if one of its components is substituted with another having a different sense.
They conclude that since senses are features of representation, intensionality arises from it,
even if the subject matter of a sentence like (3a) is not representational. By analogy, the
same should happen with hyperintensionality:
if  there’s  a  plausible  conceptualist  account  of an intensional  locution about  a  non-
representational  phenomenon, and if  plausible conceptualist  accounts of  intensional
locutions  can  be  extended  to  deliver  plausible  conceptualist  accounts  of
hyperintensional ones, why should we expect these extensions to break down when the
locutions are about non-representational phenomena? (p. 157).
In the previous section we saw some intuitive and historical reasons for rejecting the
view that de re modality can be systematically paraphrased into de dicto modality, like the
authors  seem  to  suggest.  But  regardless  of  this, I  think  that  Byrne  and  Thompson’s
argument from analogy is problematic for a number of independent reasons. First of all, the
analogy itself. Even if a full Fregean account of intensional content is available, how is that
supposed to constitute evidence for the possibility of an extended Fregean semantics that
also accounts for all kinds of worldly hyperintensional content? They declare themselves
«confident that such semantics could be formulated for most of them at least» (p. 155), but
in  the  paper  they  merely  present  alleged  counterexamples  to  (M)  and  claim  that  it  is
possible to reject (N) on the same basis, without directly addressing the issue of how the
supposed  extended  Fregean  semantics  might  look  like.  Of  course,  they  do  suggest  an
analogy at the level of ontological commitment between the two semantics. But I believe
that the real value in such a proposal would have been a preliminary understanding of the
differences between a hyperintensional Fregean semantics and its intensional version, rather
than simply remarking the obvious similarities. Furthermore, the idea of a hyperintensional
Fregean semantics able to account for all kinds of hyperintensional distinctions may sound
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too optimistic at the current time: many different semantics have so far been developed for
dealing with more or less broad families of hyperintensional contents, but «hardly any of
them has been put forth as a systematic account of all hyperintensional notions» (Berto and
Nolan 2021). Hope is the last to die, but for the time being, I think that the burden of proof
is still on Byrne and Thompson.
Second, the choice of a semantics for settling a philosophical matter might look, in a
sense, question-begging. If we try to prove that an entity, or a phenomenon (like worldly
hyperintensional content or, in Nolan’s jargon, hyperintensional phenomena) is explainable
in representational terms by adopting a semantics that literally  assumes that the entity at
stake is representational, we are probably just walking in circles. Independent arguments
for preferring that particular semantics over others with equal expressive power are needed,
otherwise  we  are  simply  showing  something  rather  trivial:  that  some  worldly
hyperintensional contents might be read also in Fregean terms. But  why should we read
them in that way? One might argue on the basis of a principle of ontological economy (a
theory with a lighter ontological commitment is to be preferred to a theory with a heavier
one), but this would simply move the problem from the object of our semantics to that of
the trade-off between ontology and ideology19.
In my opinion, the crucial point to establish is not whether it is possible to have a
conceptualist reading of worldly hyperintensional content, but rather  how and from where
hyperintensionality  arises,  regardless  of  our  semantic  preferences.  If  I  am  right,  the
conditional reconstruction of Nolan’s idea misses the point. Even if every semantics comes
with its own ontological commitment – most obviously to the entities that are chosen to
represent meanings –, appealing to the mere fact that a semantics might work at the formal
level  cannot  be  used  to  justify  the  acceptability  of  its  ontology.  One  might  reject  a
semantics by judging its ontological commitment as problematic, but it is not clear if one
can assess a metaphysical claim (like that on the source or nature of hyperintensionality) by
simply choosing a certain semantics. As noticed by Berto and Nolan 2021, «one might
think that a theory of meaning should be silent on substantive questions about what the
world is like. [...] Likewise, it might be good for a theory of meaning to be neutral about
how to understand essences, or intrinsicness of properties, or causation». 
19 See Berto and Plebani 2015 for a detailed discussion.
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Finally,  remember  Byrne  and  Thompson’s  opening  claim:  «hyperintensionality
derives from features of representations» (p. 153). Suppose that the mere adoption of a
certain semantics suffices for establishing its truth, as I believe they suggest. If that is the
case, one might develop the same kind of pseudo-argument put forward by the authors for
proving  the  opposite  of  their  claim.  All  one  needs  to  do  is  choosing  a  semantics  for
intensional content with non-representational ontological commitments and saying that, by
analogy, the same can be done for hyperintensional content. For instance, suppose that for
dealing with intensionality one adopts a version of Possible Worlds Semantics with a heavy
ontology,  such  as  Lewis’ modal  realism.  Within  this  framework,  possible  worlds  are
concrete entities, by no means less real than the actual one. More precisely, possible worlds
are defined as maximally interrelated – causally and spatiotemporally – objects, causally
isolated from one another.  This allows Lewis to provide a fully extensional analysis  of
modal notions like necessity and possibility, drawing a straightforward realist (Lewisian
extensions are uncontroversially worldly entities) and reductionist picture of intensionality.
In other words, it is a semantics that locates the source of intensionality out there in reality,
by assuming the concrete nature of possible worlds.
Now, it is pretty obvious how one might replicate Byrne and Thompson’s move for
extending the worldly nature of intensional content to hyperintensional one: it would be
sufficient  to  extend  Lewisian  realist  PWS in  a  way that  accomodates  hyperintensional
distinctions. Funnily enough, in this case we do not even need to imagine such a semantics:
Yagisawa’s extended modal realism does precisely this job. Just like Lewis with possible
worlds, Yagisawa 1988 describes an ontology of concrete impossible worlds that represent
impossibilities by instantiating them directly. If we set aside the extremely controversial
notion of  real impossibilities from the metaphysical standpoint, and focus on the purely
semantic aspect of this framework – just like Byrne and Thompson do with Fregean senses
–, we can easily recognize that, by assuming it, we would have a full non-representational,
worldly notion of hyperintensional content. For instance, the distinction between necessary
equivalents would depend entirely on the fact that, in some worlds, they do not denote the
same  objects,  regardless  of  our  ways  of  representing  them.  By  replicating  Byrne  and
Thompson’s reasoning, we could then conclude that hyperintensionality  does not derive
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from features of representations: after all, we do have a non-representational account for
hyperintensional content. 
To  rephrase  them  once  again,  if  there  is  a  plausible  worldly account  of  an
intensional  locution  about  a  non-representational  phenomenon,  and if  plausible  worldly
accounts of intensional locutions can be extended to deliver plausible worldly accounts of
hyperintensional ones, why should we expect these extensions to break down when the
locutions are about non-representational phenomena? If such an argument would not be
acceptable, as I believe, then the same is true of Byrne and Thompson’s argument. 
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III. Counterpossibles and Worldly Hyperintensionality
3.1  The  orthodoxy  on  counterpossibles  and  two  criteria  for  worldly
hyperintensionality
In the previous chapter I introduced the idea of worldly hyperintensionality and discussed
an attempt to explain it away by appealing to our conceptual faculties. As we saw, one of
the most straightforward ways for understanding worldly hyperintensionality (regardless of
whether  one is  skeptical  about  it)  passes  through the comparison with its  more known
relative: worldly intensionality. The same kind of comparison might be illuminating for a
particular  trigger  for  hyperintensionality:  that  of  counterfactual  conditionals  with  an
impossible antecedent, commonly known as  counterpossibles. I already mentioned some
hyperintensional features of conditionals in sec. 2.1, but in the present chapter I want to
focus on a peculiar class of counterpossible conditionals, for their possession of unique
properties  that,  I  believe,  constitutes  the  most  convincing  evidence  for  accepting
hyperintensionality as a real, non-representational matter. In particular, I want to highlight
two features that some counterpossibles can possess: 
(I) Indispensability: if they are required in some of our best scientific practices.
(II)  Reality: if they have a metaphysically impossible antecedent with a non-
representational subject matter.
These will also constitute my two jointly sufficient criteria for identifying cases of genuine
worldly hyperintensionality. But first, a brief introduction to ordinary counterfactuals and
the standard approach to account for them will be useful. 
Counterfactuals are conditionals with a contrary-to-the-facts antecedent, expressing
what would have been the case if the antecedent was true. A typical counterfactual is a
sentence of the form “if it was the case that p, then it would be the case that q”, and it is
supposed  to  capture  a  peculiar  relation  between  the  facts  denoted  by  ‘p’  and  ‘q’:
counterfactual dependence. Something counterfactually depends on something else if and
only if the former obtains in every relevant situation (i.e. holding fixed certain facts) in
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which the latter obtains. Standard approaches, mainly due to Lewis and Stalnaker, employ
the  apparatus  of  standard  possible  worlds  semantics  for  evaluating  the  truth  of
counterfactuals by means of a similarity relation across worlds. The technical details will
not be explored here, but an intuitive characterization of similarity is that of a way for
ordering worlds by their degree of resemblance to the actual one: the more a possible world
is similar to our world, the closer it is. This idea of proximity between worlds is often
represented as a structure of concentric spheres, in which the actual world is located at the
center,  and worlds  in  the outermost  spheres  are  progressively less  similar  to  the actual
world than those in the innermost spheres. 
With this hierarchy of worlds in mind, the truth conditions of a counterfactual are
given by checking what happens in the closest worlds in which its antecedent is true: a
sentence of the form “if it was the case that p, then it would be the case that q” is true if and
only if all of the closest p-worlds – the worlds in which the antecedent is true – are also q-
worlds. To see a classical example due to Lewis 1973:
(K) If kangaroos had no tails, they would topple over
(K) is true if and only if in every closest world to the actual one in which kangaroos have
no tails, they topple over. As one can easily notice, within this framework the conditional
behaves like a restricted necessity operator, quantifying only over those worlds with the
appropriate degree of similarity to the actual one.
What about counterfactuals with an impossible antecedent? The standard account
holds  that  every  counterfactual  with  a  necessarily  false  antecedent,  having  no possible
world that verifies it, turns out as vacuously true. The main motivations suggested by Lewis
for such vacuism, that soon became the orthodoxy on counterpossibles, primarily concern
the fact that, within classical frameworks, impossibilities imply anything (then any kind of
conditional  with  an  impossible  antecedent  will  be  true,  regardless  of  the  consequent).
Secondly, vacuism is based on the view that nothing can counterfactually depend on non-
contingent matters: in other words, that counterpossibles are uninformative. According to
Lewis, nothing can counterfactually depend on, for instance, 2+2=5, because we are not
able  to  say  how  our  opinions  would  be  different  given  such  a  circumstance.
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Counterpossibles  are  not  apt  to  say  anything  informative,  since  any  impossible
counterfactual fails to correspond to any way that the world could be: as we just saw, the
modal  space  of  counterfactuals  is  that  of  standard  possible  worlds  semantics,  therefore
there is simply no information for them to capture or convey at all.
Now, one might object that this kind of vacuism depends entirely on the semantics
that has been chosen to deal with the phenomenon at stake (counterfactual dependence),
just  like  I  did  in  section  2.3  with  Byrne  and  Thompson’s  extended  Fregeanism  for
hyperintensionality. This might be true for Lewis’ vacuism, but in recent years we saw the
development of new arguments in defense of the orthodoxy that do not necessarily depend
on  any  particular  semantics.  Among  them,  the  most  influential  are  certainly  those  of
Timothy Williamson, in which the vacuity of counterpossibles is inherited from the vacuity
of  strict  implication  and  the  substitution  principles  to  which  counterfactuals  seem  to
comply20. I will not explore the details of such defense here. 
What is more interesting for the current purposes is that, according to Williamson,
hyperintensionality occurs only in constructions that are about representational features: «if
the  substitution  of  coreferential  names  in  propositional  attitude  ascriptions  does  not
preserve truth value, the reason is that such ascriptions are about representational features»
(p.  175).  Thus,  counterpossibles  are  not  hyperintensional,  because  counterfactuals  in
general  do not  have the representational  character  of propositional  attitudes  that  makes
(SVI) fail, so it must be always possible to substitute intensionally equivalent expression
within  a  counterfactual  without  changing  its  truth  value21.  In  other  words,  Williamson
seems to suggest that one reason to accept vacuism is the fact that there is no such thing as
non-representational hyperintensionality22. So, if we are able to provide good reasons for
taking worldly hyperintensionality seriously, that might constitute a threat to vacuism. But
this means also that, if Williamson is right in claiming that counterfactuals are generally
non-representational,  the  mere  acceptance  of  some  non-vacuous  counterpossible  would
amount to  accept  cases of non-representational hyperintensionality.  However,  as we are
about to see, I think that establishing the nature of a hyperintensional content does not
20 See Williamson 2007.
21 According to Williamson, if we substitute the antecedent of a counterpossible with  some intensionally
equivalent expression, namely any other impossibility, the whole conditional will still be true.
22 This is also explicitly stated in Williamson 2013: «Hyperintensionality arises at the level of thought and
linguistic meaning, and should be explained at that level, not at the level of anything like a general theory
of properties and relations» (p. 266). 
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depend  merely  on  its  subject-matter.  In  what  follows  I  will  not  engage  directly  with
Williamson’s arguments, but I will focus on some counterexamples that have been offered
for challenging the orthodoxy – cases of alleged non-vacuous, informative counterpossibles
– and check if they can be regarded as genuinely worldly hyperintensional, according to the
criteria sketched above.
The first piece of evidence against vacuism comes from, once again, intuition. We
have a  prima facie insight that there are plenty of non-vacuously false  counterpossibles.
Consider this example from Nolan 2014:
(R) If there was a piece of steel in the shape of a 36-sided platonic solid, it  
would have fewer sides than a dodecahedron.
Since the maximum amount of sides that a solid in three-dimensional space can have is 20,
the antecedent in (R) is necessarily false (it is a metaphysical impossibility). 36 sides are
definitely more than 20, nevertheless, if one subscribes to the standard account, (R) must be
taken as true. We can draw countless examples of this kind, but according to the orthodoxy
they would  turn  out  to  be  all  vacuously  true. Quite  obviously,  the  distinction  between
different impossible antecedents and their semantic interconnections cannot be accounted
for in purely intensional terms: they are all verified in the same worlds, namely none of
them. Hence,  vacuists  cannot  account  for  the  apparent  differences  in  meaning between
different impossibilities and the apparent difference in truth value between a sentence like
(R) and:
(Ra) If there was a piece of steel in the shape of a 36-sided platonic solid, it 
would not have fewer sides than a dodecahedron.
However, even if we are willing to accept the falsity of a sentence like (R) and the truth of
(Ra), they can hardly be judged as epistemically fruitful in any non-trivial way. 
So,  the  next  question  is:  can  counterpossibles  be  genuinely informative?  Let  us
consider a quote from Field 1989:
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It  is  doubtless  true  that  nothing  sensible  can  be  said  about  how things  would  be
different if there were no number 17; that is largely because the antecedent of this
counterfactual gives us no hints as to what alternative mathematics is to be regarded as
true in the counterfactual situation in question. If one changes the example to “Nothing
sensible can be said about how things would be different if the axiom of choice were
false”, it seems wrong […]: if the axiom of choice were false, the cardinals wouldn’t
be linearly ordered, the Banach-Tarski theorem would fail and so forth. (pp. 237-8).
It seems that it is possible to formulate at least some conditional statements with impossible
antecedents  that,  if  true,  would  have  huge  consequences  on  our  understanding  of
mathematics  (as we shall  see in  section 3.2,  there is  an entire  field that  systematically
adopts this strategy for inferring truths about certain  actual features of sets).  Once again,
merely intensional resources such as those of the standard analysis of counterfactuals look
inadequate:  we face a  whole class of non-vacuous,  informative counterfactuals  that  are
sensitive to hyperintensional distinctions. 
But how do these relate to worldly hyperintensionality? I believe that, if we are
willing  to  accept  the  idea  of  a  worldly intensional  phenomenon  –  counterfactual
dependence  – expressed  by  ordinary  counterfactuals  like  (K),  in  which  nothing
“representational”  seems  to  be  involved,  we  have  no  reason  to  reject  the  idea  of  a
corresponding  worldly  hyperintensional  phenomenon  –  counterpossible  dependence  –
expressed by counterpossibles like (R).  As Berto and Nolan 2021 remark,  just  like the
behavior of a tailless kangaroo is independent of our representations of it, «which blocks of
steel have which shapes is not just about us and our representations. It would not be even if
steel could take shapes that it in fact cannot». 
Now, cases in which the alleged truth or falsity of a counterpossible that rely on
intuitions like (R) are surely interesting, but are they really compelling? The orthodoxy
defender might still stress out that the theoretical virtues of the standard approach cannot be
undermined on merely intuitive grounds. Sure, counterpossible thinking might be useful in
metaphysics, and we can formulate interesting hypothetical scenarios in counterpossible
terms, as seen with Field’s example. But the first remark would not impress someone who
takes a skeptical or deflationary stance towards metaphysics, and the second one would not
constitute good evidence for allowing a de re reading of counterpossible modality. A false
mathematical  theory  speaks  about  non-representational  objects,  but  in  formulating  an
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hypothesis like that of Field we are simply ascribing the property of being true or false to
certain statements of the theory, which is ultimately a representational object23.
But  what  if  counterpossibles  are  actually  indispensable in  some  of  our  best
scientific  practices,  in  accounting for  real  features  of  the actual  world?  That  would  be
enough  for  rejecting  vacuism,  since  its  alleged  theoretical  virtues  would  force  us  to
consider scientifically significant statements as pretty much nonsensical. Furthermore, that
would satisfy Nolan’s guiding principle: the explanatory role of hyperintensional talk for
certain  features  of  reality.  However,  if  we  want  to  take  this  as  evidence  for  worldly
hyperintensionality  in  Nolan’s  sense,  we will  need something stronger:  not  simply  that
some counterpossibles used in science are non-vacuous, but also that at least some of them
have  metaphysically impossible  antecedents  (as  opposed  to,  for  instance,  logically  or
physically  impossible  antecedents)  with  a  non-representational  subject  matter.  Mere
physical impossibility – the violation of laws of physics – can be accomodated within a
standard  possible  worlds  framework,  therefore  a  non-vacuous  counterpossible  with  a
physically impossible antecedent would not be enough to constitute evidence for worldly
hyperintensionality (not even for hyperintensionality in general). Logical impossibility, on
the other hand, does not seem to entirely depend on features of reality regardless of our
conceptual  faculties:  the  variety  of  logical  systems  which  validates  different  types  of
inference might not be a good guide to worldly matters.  Of course, these three kinds of
(im)possibility do not exhaust the whole field of modality, and the relations among them is
the object of a debate that will not be explored further here24. For the current purposes,
sticking to metaphysical impossibility will suffice.
This leads us back to our two criteria, that are meant to capture the indispensability
of the right sort of counterpossibles within scientific explanations, as opposed to the mere
possibility of describing some phenomena in counterpossible terms. If such indispensability
is  paired  with  metaphysically  impossible  antecedents  and  non-representational  subject
matter,  we have a  more rigorous way than Nolan’s for identifying at  least  one kind of
worldly hyperintensionality.  The first case study in this spirit that I shall discuss is that of
relative computability, as presented in Jenny 2018.
23 Furthermore,  a  counterpossible  with  a  mathematical  falsity  as  antecedent  might  be  considered  an
epistemic impossibility  rather  than a  metaphysical  one,  so it  might  not  constitute good evidence for
worldly hyperintensionality.
24 See Kment 2021.
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3.2 Relative computability
Jenny’s  strategy consists  in  showing how counterpossibles  play  an ineliminable  role  in
relative computability theory. An intuitive characterization of this discipline is often put
forward in counterfactual terms: for instance, given an unsolved problem P, we may ask
what else we could solve if we could solve P. More precisely, relative computability theory
is the study of what sets of natural numbers are algorithmically decidable. 
A set is algorithmically decidable if and only if it is possible for a computing agent,
by  following  an  algorithm,  to  establish  for  any  natural  number  whether  or  not  it  is  a
member of the set, in finite time and after finitely many steps. Among non-decidable sets
we find:
• the validity problem, the set that encodes the logically valid sentences of first order
logic;
• the  halting  problem,  the  set  that  encodes  the  problem  of  deciding  whether  a
computer will eventually halt when it is given a certain input;
• arithmetical  truth,  the  set  that  encodes  the  true  sentences  of  the  language  of
arithmetic.
According  to  relative  computability  theory,  it  is  possible  to  show  that  a  problem  is
reducible to another one,  namely, it is possible to show that if we have an algorithm for
deciding membership in a certain set, then we could also retrieve an algorithm for deciding
membership  in  another.  For  instance,  it  has  been  proved  that  the  halting  problem  is
reducible to the validity problem, while arithmetical truth is not, by employing peculiar
theoretical devices called oracle Turing machines. 
Oracle Turing machines are ordinary Turing machines25 that are supplied with an
oracle, namely 
25 A Turing machine is an abstract computational device «capable of a finite set of configurations q1,…,qn
[...] supplied with a  one-way infinite and one-dimensional tape divided into squares  each capable of
carrying exactly one symbol. At any moment, the machine is scanning the content of one square r which
is either blank (symbolized by S0) or contains a symbol S1,…,Sm with S1=0 and S2=1. The machine is an
automatic machine which means that at any given moment, the behavior of the machine is completely
determined by the current state and symbol being scanned» (De Mol 2019).
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an external storage device that deliver the correct answer to any “yes” or “no” question
about a particular decision problem we may ask them. For example, an oracle for the
validity problem contains, for arbitrary sentences of the predicate calculus, the answer
to the question whether they are logically valid or not. […] An oracle Turing machine
with an oracle for the validity problem can algorithmically transform the answers it
gets about the validity problem into answers about the halting problem. That’s how the
halting  problem is  Turing  reducible  to  the  validity  problem.  However,  even  if  the
oracle Turing machine can ask the oracle questions about the validity problem, it won’t
be able to transform these answers into answers about arithmetical truth. That’s how
arithmetical truth isn’t Turing reducible to the validity problem (pp. 6-7).
These results are proved in a purely mathematical way, but the reducibility or irreducibility
relation between sets that is proven can be (and, according to the author, must be) expressed
in counterfactual terms:
(valid>halt)  If  the validity  problem were algorithmically  decidable,  then the
halting problem would also be algorithmically decidable.
On the other hand, arithmetical truth is not reducible to the validity problem, therefore the
following claim is false:
(valid>arith)  If  the  validity  problem  were  algorithmically  decidable,  then
arithmetical truth would also be algorithmically decidable.
Since we know that the validity problem is not algorithmically decidable, (valid>halt) and
(valid>arith) both have an impossible antecedent,  therefore we can take them as  prima
facie non-vacuous counterpossibles. The next step for our current purposes is to understand
whether or not they are actually indispensable for relative computability theory and which
kind of impossibility is at stake in the antecedent, provided that its subject matter is non-
representational. 
According to the author, in cases like (valid>halt) and (valid>arith) we are dealing
with metaphysical impossibility, for two reasons. First, because decidability in the sense
sketched above is grounded in a metaphysically necessary principle:  the  Church-Turing
thesis, which says that «the sets that are algorithmically decidable in the informal sense, i.e.
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the sets that are decidable by any algorithmic means, are just the sets that are decidable by a
Turing  machine» (p.  6).  Since  it  has  been  arithmetically  proved that,  for  instance,  the
validity problem cannot be decided by a Turing machine, the validity problem cannot be
algorithmically decidable at all. But this kind of Turing computability has nothing to do
with our technological or physical capability. When Church and Turing say that the validity
problem is  not  decidable,  they  mean that  it  would impossible  to  find  an algorithm for
deciding it, even if we had no technological limitations or constraints from the actual laws
of physics. The tape of a Turing machine – and hence its memory – is infinite, so for a
function to be Turing computable it is sufficient that a set of instructions that will result in a
Turing machine computing the function exists, no matter how much time will it take. But
non-decidable  sets  cannot  be computed even in  an  infinite  amount  of  time.  In Jenny’s
words:
Before anyone had built anything resembling a modern computer, Church and Turing
had already identified computational  problems that no computer could ever decide.
And  since  the  invention  of  the  first  computer,  all  technological  innovations  in
computing,  including  innovations  involving  quantum computers  that  are  yet  to  be
realized, have merely lead to an increase in computing speed and efficiency; they never
have and never will lead to an improvement in what can be algorithmically decided (p.
8).
The second reason, more direct yet more controversial, has to do with the nature of abstract
objects.  According to the author,  claiming that a set  is  not algorithmically  decidable is
equivalent to claiming that there is no algorithm that could decide it. Since algorithms are
mind-independent abstract objects, if an algorithm does not exist in the actual world, it
cannot exist in any other metaphysically possible world. Therefore, any counterfactual in
which the antecedent expresses the existence of a non-actual algorithm, like (valid>halt)
and (valid>arith), must be a counterpossible in the stronger metaphysical sense26.
If Jenny’s arguments on the nature and non-vacuity of such counterpossibles are
compelling, the only thing left to establish is whether they are actually indispensable for
relative computability theory. The author’s general defense for this  view consists in the
appeal  to  a  certain  philosophical  humility against  the  orthodoxy  on  counterpossibles:
«whenever an established mathematical or scientific discipline purports to study a certain
26 The necessary existence of abstract objects like numbers has been disputed (see Yablo 2014).
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phenomenon, we shouldn’t give in to philosophical considerations that suggest that there is
no such phenomenon to be studied» (p. 11). In other words, the property of a set of being
reducible to another is something that we cannot deny or explain away by appealing to the
fact that our only way of understanding it is in counterpossible terms. Skepticism towards a
phenomenon  on  the  basis  of  mere  semantic  preferences  is  highly  problematic,  as
extensively shown in section 2.3.
In light of this, the last strategy available to the die-hard vacuist consists in arguing
that when relative computability theorists asserts sentences like (valid>halt) they are not
actually employing counterpossibles. For instance, (valid>halt) might simply be a useful
evocative  idiom  for  illustrating  reducibility,  but  it  is  not  meant  to  be  taken  literally.
However,  as  Jenny notices,  sentences  like  (valid>halt)  do not  semantically  behave like
idioms: they are compositional, while idioms typically are not27. 
In sum, if  Jenny is  right  in taking counterpossible talk in relative computability
theory seriously, since counterpossibles like those discussed above sit at the very core of
the theory, it seems that the indispensability criterion is satisfied as well. A de re reading of
reducibility or irreducibility relations between sets, which are relations of counterpossible
dependence  –  i.e.  a  special  case  of  counterfactual  dependence  in  which  metaphysical
impossibility  is  involved  –,  might  then  constitute  our  first  candidate  for  worldly
hyperintensionality.
3.3 Explanation and counterpossible reasoning in natural sciences
Tan 2019 adopts a similar strategy for arguing against the orthodoxy on counterpossibles,
providing a set of examples from natural sciences. In the current section I will illustrate
them and assess their eligibility as genuine cases of worldly hyperintensionality.
The  author  identifies  three  kinds  of  counterpossible  indispensability  in  science:
scientific explanation, model-based reasoning and reasoning about superseded theories. He
begins by noticing how counterfactual dependence is a key element for our understanding
27 A sentence like ‘I’m keeping an eye out for you’ sounds linguistically appropriate, while ‘it’s an eye that
I’m  keeping  out  for  you’ sounds odd.  This is  because  the  meaning  of  the  former  is  not  derived
compositionally from the meanings of its parts, but it is directly encoded by the whole expression. In
contrast, counterfactuals about relative computability interact with other sentence constructions just like
ordinary counterfactuals do. See Jenny 2018 for the replies to other objections.
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of  the  relations  that  backs  explanation  in  natural  sciences,  such  as  causality  (not
surprisingly, one of the most popular theories of causality is Lewis’ counterfactual account).
Furthermore,
the  role  of  the  counterfactual  conditional  in  scientific  explanations  is  not  limited
merely  to  specifying  that  some  state  of  affairs  physically  depends  on  another.
Counterfactuals  also  help  identify  what  is relevant,  explanatorily,  for  one  state  of
affairs to bring about another (pp. 38-39).
For instance,  the  fact  that  a  glass  breaks  if  exposed to  a  sound of  the right  pitch  and
amplitude does not depend on whether that sound was meaningful – like that of a song –,
precisely because it would still break even if the sound expressed a different content, or no
content at all,  while it would not break if the pitch or the amplitude were different: we
express all of this in the form of a counterfactual. As remarked by the author, explanation is
a matter of exhibiting systematic relations of counterfactual dependence.
In light of this ubiquitous explanatory character of counterfactual dependence, the
idea  of  rejecting  the  appropriateness  of  a  counterfactual  reading  whenever  we  face
something that looks like a counterpossible conditional within a scientific context begins to
appear problematic. Consider the following:
(D) If diamond had not been covalently bonded, then it would have been a  
better electrical conductor.
(D) is meant to capture the dependence of diamond’s properties at the macroscopic level on
its structural properties at the microscopic level, an essential part of the explanation of its
poor electric conductivity. That is so because, following Woodward 2003, «the provision of
any explanation of some fact is incomplete until one specifies, counterfactually, how that
very fact would have been different under various circumstances» (p. 43). If this is the case,
we can safely conclude that a sentence like (D) satisfies our indispensability criterion.
Now, it is an essential property of diamond of being covalently bonded – it is what
distinguishes it from other allotropes of carbon such as graphene, which is an exceptional
conductor –, therefore it is necessarily so: it is covalently bonded in every possible world.
But  this  means  that  the  antecedent  in  (D)  is  a  metaphysical  impossibility:  (D)  is  a
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counterpossible in the stronger metaphysical sense sketched in the previous sections, so it
satisfies our reality criterion. Indeed, according to the author, 
the fact that (D) features in an explanation of a particular substance’s properties, and
describes the relationship between two of that substance’s properties, suggests that a de
re reading of its apparent referring terms is its correct interpretation (p. 41). 
And precisely by adopting a de re reading of the antecedent we can conclude that this kind
of counterfactual dependence is a genuine instance of worldly hyperintensionality: a fact
grounded in the properties of a real actual object, regardless of our representations or the
epistemic roles that we associate with its descriptions.
The second set of examples is that of idealized models. A typical strategy for testing
hypotheses  in  science consists  in  building highly idealized models  in  which contingent
factors  that  would  be  extremely  difficult  to  compute  are  minimized.  Among  classical
examples of such idealizations we find blatant impossibilities such as frictionless planes,
pendulums with massless strings and so on. According to the author, some of them are
metaphysical impossibilities, yet they are extremely useful for understanding a wide class
of phenomena. This is, again, expressed in the counterfactual form. Take the case of models
that are commonly used for wave propagation in water like the Navier-Stokes equations for
fluid flow, which represent it as a continuous and incompressible medium. Since water is
necessarily  H2O  –  namely,  a  substance  composed  of  discrete  molecules  –,  any
counterfactual  with  an  antecedent  that  represents  water  as  a  continuous  substance  is  a
counterpossible. Nevertheless, an idealization like:
(W) If water were a continuous, incompressible medium, then it would behave
as the Navier-Stokes equations describe
is successful, since actual water behaves approximately like how it would have behaved if
it was a continuous substance. In light of this, it becomes difficult for the defender of the
orthodoxy to maintain that (W) is vacuously true. For what concerns our notion of worldly
hyperintensionality,  here  the  point  is  less  obvious.  Sure,  the  antecedent  is  about  a
metaphysically impossible non-representational object, but the counterfactual dependence
relation is ascribed with respect to a set of equations employed in a theoretical framework,
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which one might be not willing to consider totally non-representational, in contrast to an
object’s  properties.  Nevertheless,  (W) seems to  satisfy both  of  our  criteria  for  worldly
hyperintensionality.
Last but not least, reasoning about superseded theories. Tan’s point here is that, just
like in the case of idealized models, there is a widespread use of counterpossibles in science
when it comes to explain why a certain theory fails to account for a certain phenomenon.
The main example that he chooses to illustrate this is the following:
(B1) If Bohr’s theory of the atom had been true, then an electron’s angular  
momentum L in the ground state would have been observed at L=ℏ (that is,  
the reduced Planck constant).
(B2) It is not the case that an electron’s angular momentum L in the
ground state is observed at L=ℏ.
(B3) Therefore, Bohr’s theory of the atom is false.
Suppose that (B1) is vacuously true. If that is the case, it would not manage to convey any
actual  information about  Bohr’s  theory,  therefore one would not  be able  to  employ an
empirical  observation  like  (B2)  to  reject  it.  Tan  then  concludes  that  «in  order  for  this
commonplace  pattern  of  reasoning  to  be  epistemically  fruitful,  theory-evaluating
conditionals must describe genuine relations of counterfactual dependence and implication»
(p. 49). In other words, a conditional like (B1) must be be non-vacuously true. But is (B1) a
counterpossible? Since Bohr’s theory of the atom is a paradigmatic case of an inconsistent
theory – it rests on assumptions from both classical and quantum physics for representing
electrons –, a sentence that claims its truth would be a contradiction. Therefore, (B1) is
clearly a logical impossibility. According to the author, since metaphysical possibility is a
subset of logical possibility, (B1) is a fortiori metaphysically impossible.
Regardless of one’s opinion on modal matters like the relation between logical and
metaphysical possibility, I believe that, despite its being an interesting case, this would not
constitute a genuine case of worldly hyperintensionality. Since it involves counterpossible
reasoning, it can obviously be accounted for only within a hyperintensional framework, but
this does not suffice for instantiating our stronger notion of worldly hyperintensionality.
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Even on a de re reading of the antecedent, a counterpossible like (B1) is neither about an
object  independent  from  our  conceptual  faculties  (theories  are  a  product  of  human
thinking),  nor  suggests  any  other  reason  for  taking  it  as  describing  some  non-
representational phenomenon. The difference between this case and those discussed above
is  that  here  we use  counterpossibles  to  describe  a  methodological  process,  so they are
ultimately  sentences  that  speak  about a  theory,  while  in  the  previous  cases  the
counterpossibles  are  part  of  a  theory and  speak  about  certain  non-representational
phenomena. Nonetheless, it is still perfectly reasonable that some counterpossibles implied
in Bohr’s theory which are directly about the nature of the atom might be genuine cases of
worldly hyperintensionality.
Despite the relative controversy of the last two examples, I believe that what is most
valuable for the present discussion is that we identified at least another kind of non-vacuous
counterpossibles that admits a non-representational  de re reading (the most natural one),
which is also to a large extent commonplace in our best scientific practices. Something
along these lines emerges also from Tan’s concluding remarks against the orthodoxy on
counterpossibles. As already noticed, the standard approach to counterfactuals is meant to
capture a certain phenomenon, that of counterfactual dependence, which is widely regarded
to be at the core of our best theories of explanatory reasoning, causality, microphysical and
mechanistic realization, and so on. We saw that science makes an extensive, more or less
explicit use of counterpossibles, that the orthodoxy treats as vacuous. But this is equivalent
not simply to saying that many meaningful pieces of science are nonsensical, but also to
considering the very use of counterfactuals as a mistaken choice:
The orthodoxy’s incompatibility with the way that science uses counterfactuals means
that it fails to accurately capture the phenomenon it was meant to capture, namely, the
counterfactual conditional. [...] The counterfactual is not merely a toy of philosophers
and  linguists.  Hence,  if  one’s  philosophical  or  linguistic  theory  of  how  the
counterfactual works is incompatible with the way it is used in those core contexts, that
is a sufficient reason for the theory to be rejected. For that would mean that that theory
fails to accurately capture the very phenomenon for which it was built to account. It is
the phenomena that must be saved, not the theories built to account for them. A theory
of the counterfactual fails to save the phenomenon if it is inconsistent with the way the
counterfactual  is  used  in  those  contexts,  or  worse,  if  it  declares  that  those  uses
constitute an incorrect way of using the counterfactual (pp. 58-59).
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With  this  in  mind,  we  might  finally  try  to  figure  out  the  hyperintensional
phenomenon (in Nolan’s sense) at stake in the case studies discussed so far. My modest
suggestion is that we might consider the relation of counterpossible dependence as the true
hyperintensional phenomenon involved in our examples. Such relation, as seen in cases like
(D), might hold between higher-level and lower-lever properties of real objects, just like
ordinary counterfactual dependence might hold between facts, chains of events or objects
and their modal properties. Since we ordinarily admit a  de re reading of counterfactual
dependence,  I  believe that the widespread use of counterpossibles in our best  scientific
practices – in which the commitment to the non-representational character of their contents
is not easily disputable – constitutes sufficient support for such reading also in some cases
of counterpossible dependence.
3.4 Strong emergence in chemistry
In  the  previous  section  we saw that  one  of  the  most  compelling  examples  of  worldly
hyperintensionality comes from a special kind of counterfactual dependence fundamental to
the explanation of certain chemical phenomena, such as the poor electrical conductivity of
diamond. Chemistry is also the environment to which belongs my final case study: strong
emergence, a thesis on the nature of the relationship between certain chemical and physical
properties. In a series of papers on the topic, Robin Hendry extensively describes how to
characterize  this  phenomenon  in  a  rigorous  way  and  defends  his  plausibility  against
reductionist perspectives. In what follows, I will explore this idea and assess whether it is
possible to understand it as another instance of worldly hyperintensionality.
In the philosophy of chemistry, reductionism is the view according to which, at least
in principle, the whole field of chemistry is reducible to physics. On an epistemic reading,
this amounts to say that every phenomenon described by chemistry could in principle be
translated in the language of physics; while on an ontological reading it says that every
chemical property is nothing more than a physical property: physics is causally closed and
exhausts the whole range of phenomena that we observe at the higher level of chemistry.
Many accounts of this dependence have been developed (identity, supervenience, and so
on), but such technicalities are not important for the current purposes. Instead, the focus
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here will be on the emergentist thesis that is offered as an alternative to reductionism, since,
according to Hendry 2017, «the scientific evidence for the existence of strong emergence in
chemistry is at least as good as the evidence for reductionist positions that rule it out» (p.
2).
An important preliminary distinction to be made is that between  weak and  strong
emergence. A property is weakly emergent from physics if the current theoretical resources
provided by physics are not sufficient for predicting or explaining the fact that a system
displays that property. On the other hand, a property strongly emerges from physics if such
failure of prediction or explanation is there  in principle:  in other words, if  it  would be
impossible to explain that property by means of the resources of physics only, even with an
ideally  perfect  theory.  Hendry  adopts  a  causal  criterion  for  the  reality  of  a  property,
according  to  which  existing  requires  the  possession  of  causal  powers.  Following  this
principle,  one  can  identify  the  presence  of  an  emergent  property  by  recognizing  the
presence of causal powers in addition to those explained by physics. Now, one might think
that  this  would  conflict  with  the  laws  of  physics,  but  according  to  the  author  «the
possession of novel causal powers does not require the violation of more fundamental laws.
Strong  emergence  requires  not  that  these  laws  be  broken,  but  only  that  they  fail  to
determine what happens» (p. 2). In other words, Hendry’s view does not conflict with the
laws of physics themselves, but only with the causal closure of physics. 
So, which kind of causal powers strong emergence involves, if they are not of the
sort that is captured by pure physical descriptions? Hendry’s opinion is that the distinctive
feature of strongly emergent properties is their manifesting downward causation: emergent
systems exhibit higher-level properties that determine a difference at the lower level from
which they emerge, that would not be present if the system complied only with its lower-
level  basic  laws.  In  Hendry’s  words:  «the  subsystems  of  an  emergent  supersystem
sometimes do something different to what they would do if the causal structure of the world
were as imagined by the reductionist» (p. 2). As one can easily notice, this corresponds to a
counterfactual claim, that the author calls counternomic, due to its reference to certain non-
actual laws (those endorsed by the reductionist). In other words, emergence is semantically
captured by counterfactuals with a physically impossible antecedent.
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 Despite  the  apparent  intuitiveness  of  the  reductionist  perspective,  the  choice
between emergentism and reductionism should be guided by scientific evidence. So, what
evidence  do  we  have  for  the  existence  of  strongly  emergent  properties  in  chemistry?
Throughout his  works Hendry illustrates a variety of cases,  but I believe that the most
interesting  for  the  current  purposes  is  that  of  molecular  structure.  On  this  matter,  the
reductionist stance is that molecules are nothing more than systems of charged particles,
interacting according to the laws of quantum mechanics. This is captured by means of a
Schrödinger equation: a mathematical expression that describes an isolated molecule purely
in terms of its electrons and nuclei and that, once solved, explains the peculiar structure of
the  molecule,  which  in  turn  explains  the  behavior  of  a  substance  at  the  macroscopic
chemical level. However, to solve the Schrödinger equations for atoms more complex than
hydrogen (the only atom with a Schrödinger equation that is analytically solvable) or for
molecules,  quantum  chemists  require  to  calibrate  the  physical  models  with  a  set  of
assumptions drawn from chemistry. In other words, quantum chemists need to introduce
well-understood approximations at the fundamental level – known falsehoods – that will
affect the calculations. As remarked in Hendry 2009,
quantum chemistry turns out not to meet the strict demands of classical reductionism,
because  its  models  bear  only  a  loose  relationship  to  exact  atomic  and  molecular
Schrödinger equations, and its explanations seem to rely on just the sort of chemical
information that, in a classical reduction, ought to be derived (p. 183).
One of the cases in which such move is most evident is that of isomers. Isomers are
distinct molecules sharing the same molecular formula, namely, molecules composed of
exactly  the  same  atoms  in  the  same  number.  For  instance,  ethanol  (CH3CH2OH)  and
dimethyl ether (CH3OCH3) are two molecules in which the same number of atoms of the
same  kind  are  arranged  in  different  structures,  that  in  turn  give  rise  to  very  different
properties. In order to build the complete Schrödinger equation of a molecule, one needs its
resultant Hamiltonian, an operator corresponding to the total energy of the system which
takes  into account  all  the intra-molecular  interactions,  using only  fundamental  physical
interactions as input. But since isomers differ only in structure, they will share the same
resultant  Hamiltonian:  in  other  words,  it  is  impossible  to  distinguish  them at  the  pure
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physical level28.  In order to account for their  distinction,  quantum chemists  employ the
configurational Hamiltonian, an operator that allows to specify the nuclear positions within
a molecule in  order to  account  for  its  structure.  But  this  structural  insight  comes from
chemistry’s  empirical  observations:  it  is  not  something that  could  be  deduced,  even in
principle,  from  our  best  physical  descriptions  of  the  molecules.  In  other  words,
configurational  Hamiltonians  assume  higher-level  information  that  impose  on  the
Schrödinger equation the molecular structure that is supposed to be derived. Furthermore,
«since a molecule’s causal powers depend on its structure, its behaviour would be different
were it determined by more basic (quantum-mechanical) laws governing the particles of
which the molecule is made» (p. 189). 
According to  Hendry,  this  instantiates  the  counternomic  criterion  for  downward
causation, making molecular structure a strongly emergent property.
In an emergent complex system, the behaviour of the basic stuff of which it is made is
governed by a configurational Hamiltonian, which is different from what it would be
were its behaviour governed by the resultant Hamiltonian. Since the Hamiltonian of a
system determines the precise nature of the physical law that governs its behaviour, to
say that some system exhibits downward causation is to make a counternomic claim
about it – that its behaviour would be different were it determined only by the more
basic laws governing the stuff of which it is made (Hendry 2009 p. 185).
In the author’s view, this amounts to say that it is impossible to specify all the properties of
an emergent system at the basic physical level. The reason why this happens is not because
the mathematics to compute certain properties would be too complex, but because those
properties are simply not there: they do not exist at the scale of quantum mechanics. A
resultant  Hamiltonian  cannot  specify the structure  of  a  molecule at  the quantum scale,
precisely because there is no structure at that scale. Molecular structure is possessed only
at the chemical scale, and it partially determines the entities found at the physical level.
From our semantic perspective,  instances of the counternomic criterion has been
read so far as counterfactuals with a physically impossible antecedent. But I believe that a
more careful reading of it would reveal some curious features.  We saw that isomers like
ethanol and dimethyl ether are distinguishable only in virtue of their different structures,
28 Besides their inadequacy for distinguishing molecular structure, resultant Hamiltonians are never used
primarily for practical reasons: they would be too complex to calculate (see Hendry 2009).
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that, if we agree with Hendry, are emergent properties that can be accounted for only at the
chemical level. This is captured by means of a counterfactual claim like the following:
(IS) If the properties of a molecule were determined at the quantum level only,
then ethanol and dimethyl ether would be the same molecule.
If Hendry is right, the antecedent in (IS) is physically impossible. But since the structure of
a molecule cannot even in principle be retrieved at the quantum level, the antecedent in (IS)
would also imply that the structure of a molecule is irrelevant for its identity. However, it
seems  reasonable  to  maintain  that  molecular  structure  is  an  essential  property:  it  is
metaphysically impossible that a molecule, being a natural kind, has a different structure
than his own, otherwise it would be a different molecule, as in the case of isomers.
But if that is the case, a sentence like (IS) would be a counterpossible similar to
those saw in the previous sections. Thus, the question for the current purposes is: would
(IS)  satisfy  our  criteria  for  worldly  hyperintensionality?  As  far  as  non-representational
subject matter  is  concerned,  my take is  that  cases like (IS) satisfy the reality  criterion:
molecular  structure  and  the  properties  that  it  determines  are  uncontroversially  real,
regardless of our descriptions of them29. Is the use of counterpossibles like (IS) and, more
generally, Hendry’s counternomic criterion indispensable for science? They can be regarded
indispensable at least insofar they feature in the explanation of the philosophical thesis of
strong emergentism, which is a way of interpreting ontological relationships between real
entities on the one hand, but also epistemic relations between scientific theories on the
other. If Hendry is right in claiming that quantum chemists implicitly adopt an emergentist
stance  when  accounting  for  molecular  structure,  we  might  conclude  that  the
counterpossibles used for explaining strong emergence are an essential part of the theory.
Therefore, they might be considered indispensable in an indirect way, as long as we choose
to subscribe to Hendry’s position.
An  interesting  question  that  might  be  raised  at  this  point  is  whether  such
hyperintensional reading of the counternomic treatment of emergence can be extended to
29 Unless one subscribes to some form of hard materialism holding that the things that exists are only those
described by physics, which might have some trouble in accounting for molecular structure, as we just
saw.
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all kinds of alleged emergent properties, even outside the field of chemistry30. I will not
explore this hypothesis in the present work, but it is worthy to suggest that, if it turns out
tenable, then the general notion of emergence itself, being ultimately grounded on a relation
of  counterpossible  dependence,  might  be  considered  as  a  worldly  hyperintensional
phenomenon.
3.5 Making sense of counterpossible dependence
We saw that a worldly hyperintensional phenomenon can be defined as a phenomenon that
satisfies some criteria that allow for a  de re reading of its hyperintensional features. The
common feature that all of the cases discussed above share is the relation of dependence
captured  by the  counterpossibles  used  to  explain  them.  Thus,  we might  say  that  some
instances of reducibility in relative computability theory, some properties of substances and
strong emergence in chemistry are all hyperintensional phenomena in a derivative sense.
The hyperintensional phenomenon stricto sensu involved in all of them – that invoked for
explaining certain aspects of the world – is counterpossible dependence. Making sense of
this relation is far from obvious: for the time being, I will limit myself to suggest a possible
pathway.
From now on, I will no longer speak about the truth of certain propositions, but
about the obtaining states of affairs – i.e. facts – that ground it. We can summarize the
relations of dependence between states of affairs identified in our case studies as follows: 
• The fact that the halting problem cannot be decided partly depends on the fact that
the validity problem cannot be decided.
• The fact  that  diamond is  a poor electrical  conductor (despite its  being a carbon
allotrope) partly depends on the fact that it is covalently bonded.
• The fact that isomers are not the same molecule partly depends on the fact that their
properties are not fully determined at the microphysical level.
30 Emergent properties have been adopted  for explaining a wide variety of phenomena in philosophy of
mind, physics and biology, among others. See Gibb, Hendry and Lancaster 2019 for an in-depth review.
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We can notice that in the first case the dependence relation seems to hold between two
states of affairs that obtain in the actual world only in virtue of an absence (there is no
algorithm that can decide the validity problem). The second case is less weird, since even if
it is captured in counterpossible terms, the dependence relation here is between two positive
facts. In the third case, the dependence relation is between two states of affairs that obtain
in the actual world in virtue of something that does not (and cannot) happen. At a first
glance, this might look quite confusing. But we can try to make sense of it by appealing to a
theory of states of affairs, especially one that allows the existence of negative facts.
Negative facts are obtaining states of affairs picked out by talk of absences, lacks
and ways things are not. For instance, a negative fact can be picked out by a sentence of the
form ‘a’s not being F’, where a is a particular, like a substance or an individual, and F is a
property. Some authors have argued that, besides the free use that we make of them in our
ordinary speech, we need negative facts in our ontology in order to explain causal relations,
material constitution, or to ground the truth of certain propositions. Despite a widespread
suspicion on their  metaphysical  status,  according to authors like Barker and Jago, they
come at no additional ontological cost, as long as we already accept positive facts in our
ontology. In their 2011’s paper, they develop a theory of negative facts that is built upon
Armstrong’s theory of facts as substantial metaphysical entities. According to this account,
facts are irreducible non-mereological wholes having individuals, properties and relations
as constituents (even if in Armstrong’s picture individuals, properties and relations are only
abstractions from the state of affairs, which is the fundamental entity). Without digging
deep in the technical  details,  we can follow Barker  and Jago 2011 for a  sketch of the
difference between positive and negative facts:
if  the lake’s being frozen is the state of affairs that results when the (thin particular)
lake is tied to the property of frozenness in one way, then the lake’s not being frozen is
the state of affairs that results when the (thin particular) lake is tied to the property of
frozenness in another way. If the first  way is instantiation, then the second is anti-
instantiation.  The  first  way gives  one kind of  non-mereological  whole,  the  second
gives another. Neither kind of tie nor corresponding kind of whole is reducible to the
other kind of tie or whole (p. 3).
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Both positive and negative facts are spatiotemporally located where their constituents are.
Hence, a negative fact like Anna’s not being hungry at t is spatially located where Anna is
at  t and temporally located at  t. But what about absences captured by negative existential
facts? Do they entail the contradiction that some non-existent objects exist? According to
Barker and Jago, claiming this is the result of confusing that which is absent (which can be
a non-existent object, like an algorithm for deciding the validity problem) with that which
exists (the absence itself): within this framework, negative states can exist just like positive
ones.  The  only  difference  between  them is  the  kind  of  non-mereological  composition
involved. So, when we say that there is no algorithm that can decide the validity problem, it
is  the algorithm that  does  not exist,  but  the fact  that  there is  no such algorithm is  an
existing state of affairs that belongs to the actual world. The fact is not the algorithm, so no
contradiction is involved.
Putting  this  idea  to  work,  we  might  conclude  that  in  the  case  of  relative
computability  theory  (valid>halt)  would  capture  the  dependence  relation  of  a  negative
existential fact – there is no algorithm that can decide the halting problem – on another
negative existential fact – there is no algorithm that can decide the validity problem –. Both
of them would be real actual facts, in compliance with our picture of a hyperintensional
phenomenon that has its source in the world. In the case of emergence, we would have a
negative fact – dimethyl ether is not ethanol – that depends on another – their properties’
not being fully determined at the microphysical level –, allowing for a de re reading of their
relation captured by (IS).
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IV. Final Remarks
Hyperintensionality, when taken seriously, is a complex theoretical challenge that is still
relatively little explored and comes in many shapes and flavors. So, the fact that it might be
difficult to appreciate all of them is not a surprise. Nolan believes that we are currently on
the verge of a new revolution in philosophy, as already happened with the development of
intensional  machinery  before,  and  that  within  a  few  decades  the  consensus  on
hyperintensionality will be the same that we see nowadays on intensionality. But from the
radical  skepticism  of  the  die-hard  intensionalists  to  the  full-fledged  realism  on
hyperintensional  phenomena  advocated  by  Nolan,  the  step  is  definitely  not  short.
Regardless of one’s opinion on the prospects for an “hyperintensional revolution”, in the
present work I tried to offer a feasible reading of Nolan’s suggestion – hyperintensionality
can be a worldly phenomenon independent from our representations – by focusing on a
paradigmatic  case  of  trigger  for  hyperintensionality,  namely  counterfactuals  with  an
impossible antecedent; articulating two jointly sufficient criteria for a counterpossible to
capture an instance of worldly hyperintensionality; building an analogy with intensional
worldly phenomena and gathering evidence from scientific practices and their philosophical
implications.  This  resulted  in  the  detection  of  patterns  of  counterpossible  dependence
occurring in all of the case studies discussed.
My strategy consisted first in differentiating between a weaker and a stronger sense
of  non-representational  hyperintensionality.  In  the  former  case,  the  alleged  non-
representational character depends merely on the absence of propositional attitudes, but the
contexts at stake can still be indirectly traced back to representations or some pre-theoretic
intuitive semantics (see section 2.1). In the latter case, the non-representational character
depends entirely on the fact that a certain worldly phenomenon requires hyperintensional
language for being explained. Following Nolan, we saw that such requirement is the first
clue for locating the source of at least some cases of hyperintensionality in the world rather
than in our representations of it:  this lead to the label of “worldly hyperintensionality”.
Metaphysics  provides  the  typical  theoretical  background  from  which  worldly
hyperintensionality  in  this  sense can  be recognized.  After  discussing some of  the  most
relevant cases, at least three important points have emerged:
53
1)  Being  a  hyperintensional  phenomenon  is  not  sufficient  for  being  worldly
hyperintensional. Apparently, it seems reasonable to assume that every instance of worldly
hyperintensionality  is  a  hyperintensional  phenomenon,  but  surely  not  every
hyperintensional phenomenon is a case of worldly hyperintensionality. If we subscribe to
Nolan’s jargon, even intentional states like belief (which are clearly representational) are
hyperintensional phenomena, since they require hyperintensional resources to be accounted
for.  Hence,  we  need  some  further  criteria  for  distinguishing  cases  of  representational
hyperintensional phenomena from cases of worldly hyperintensional phenomena.
2)  A non-representational  content  might  be  describable by  means  of  hyperintensional
statements,  but  this  does  not  legitimize to  infer  the source of  its  hyperintensionality  in
features of the objects that it  denotes: it might still be the case that it derives from our
representations. The distinctive feature of worldly hyperintensionality as understood in the
present  work  is  that  a  non-representational  phenomenon  cannot  be  explained  without
hyperintensional  language,  for  instance  by  means  of  paraphrases.  However,  non-
representational  subject  matter  retains  a  key  role  in  the  understanding  of  worldly
hyperintensionality:  even epistemically  fruitful  hypotheses  like that  of  Field concerning
different – thus, impossible – mathematical truths expressed in counterpossible terms might
not be suitable candidates for worldly hyperintensionality (see section 3.1).
3) The semantics that we choose to account for hyperintensionality should not be taken as a
guide for establishing its source or nature. The problem of the source (representations vs.
world)  of  hyperintensionality  should  be  distinguished  from  the  problem  of  finding  a
suitable hyperintensional semantics. Collapsing the two epistemic tasks leads to a number
of  counterintuitive  and  unpalatable  consequences,  as  shown  in  section  2.3  with  the
discussion of Byrne and Thompson’s conceptualism, which I rejected.
In light of this,  we can attempt to provide some definitions.  The first,  which is  simply
Nolan’s  guiding  principle  in  a  more  rigorous  form,  concerns  what  it  takes  for  a
phenomenon to be hyperintensional:
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(HP)  A  phenomenon  is  hyperintensional  if  and  only  if  it  requires
hyperintensional language to be accounted for.
The  second  definition  concerns  what  it  takes  for  a  phenomenon  to  be  worldly
hyperintensional:
(WP) A phenomenon is worldly hyperintensional if and only if it satisfies some
criteria that support a de re reading of its hyperintensional features.
(WP) does not specify the criteria for the de re reading, because they may vary across
different kinds of hyperintensional phenomena. In section 3.1 I put forward two specific
criteria for counterpossibles, that might also serve as a starting point for understanding how
general criteria for any case of worldly hyperintensionality should look like.
This brings us to the evidence. As far as metaphysics is concerned, Nolan suggests
that  we  have  plenty  of  examples  for  taking  the  idea  of  worldly  hyperintensionality
seriously. Among them, counterpossible conditionals turn out to be of particular interest
even  outside  of  the  field  of  metaphysics.  In  particular,  the  widespread  use  of  them in
science already stimulated a number of philosophers to argue against vacuism, the thesis
according to which all counterpossibles are vacuously true. On the assumption that they are
right, we face potential cases of hyperintensionality from disciplines that uncontroversially
speak about real features of the actual world (the subject matters of scientific theories is
typically non-representational, at  least  in the case of natural sciences). Furthermore,  the
epistemic credit given to science is typically stronger than that given to metaphysics. So,
the need for hyperintensional resources (in the form of counterpossibles) in science would
constitute the best evidence available for locating some instances of hyperintensionality in
the world. However, the mere possibility of counterpossible talk within scientific practice
would not be enough, just like not every kind of impossibility appealed in some explanation
would be appropriate. 
These remarks lead to the formulation of two jointly sufficient criteria for a  de re
reading of hyperintensionality that are supposed to strengthen Nolan’s guiding principle,
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which is based on the view that phenomena can be classified by detecting a principled need
for a certain kind of expressive resources to explain them. In order for a counterpossible to
be considered worldly hyperintensional – i.e. capturing a non-representational phenomenon
in the world –, it must at least satisfy the indispensability criterion, according to which it
must  be required  in  some scientific  explanation;  and the  reality criterion,  according to
which it  must  have a  metaphysically  impossible  antecedent  with a  non-representational
subject matter.
My first case study (section 3.2) is that of relative computability theory. Following
Jenny, we saw how the property of certain sets of being reducible or irreducible to others –
e.g. if we had an algorithm to decide the validity problem, we would have also an algorithm
to decide the halting problem – is explainable only in counterpossible terms. But we want
to maintain that such property is something possessed by the sets themselves, not simply by
the sentences that we use to describe them. Hence, it seems reasonable to conclude that we
identified a real relation of counterpossible dependence between sets, by means of which
we understand real and informative properties of them.
The  second  case  study  (section  3.3)  is  that  of  counterpossibles  within  natural
sciences. Following Tan, we recognized that at least one kind of counterpossibles, those
required to fully explain the behavior of certain chemical substances, satisfies both of our
criteria. This, again, legitimizes a  de re reading of the counterpossible’s referring terms,
suggesting  a  real  relation  of  counterpossible  dependence  between  the  properties  of  a
substance.
Lastly, I discussed a case study at the crossroads of science and metaphysics: that of
strong emergence in chemistry (section 3.4). Here we saw how the relation of downward
causation,  that Hendry argues to  be the distinctive feature of strong emergence,  is  best
understood by means of counterpossibles. The specific example discussed – that of the
molecular  structure of  isomers  – seems to  satisfy at  least  our  reality  criterion,  since it
involves the relation of counterpossible dependence between non-representational contents
like  molecules  and  their  structural  properties.  The  indispensability  criterion  might  be
considered  indirectly  satisfied  as  long  as  quantum  chemists  implicitly  assume  strong
emergence in their explanations, as Hendry suggests.
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The  analogy  with  intensionality  provides  us  the  best  way  to  understand  the
difference between representational and worldly hyperintensionality, and how the role of
counterpossibles  in  scientific  explanation  underlies  a  real  pattern  of  relations  of
counterpossible  dependence between different  entities.  An intensional  ascription can be
often read according to a de dicto interpretation or to a de re interpretation. Now, it is not
always clear which one is the best reading, which can depend on the context in which the
sentence is asserted. But for the current purposes, it is enough to recognize that intensional
ascriptions  can  sometimes  be  de  re  (see  section  2.2.),  as  it  is  orthodox  nowadays:
intensionality, in the form of modal properties possessed by objects, can be something due
to the world, regardless of our representations.
The hope is that what has been explored in the present work could help to establish
the same for hyperintensionality. When faced with some hyperintensional content we can
ask: is its hyperintensionality due to the world or to our representations? This amounts to
say:  the hyperintensional  distinctions  that a semantics would need to  retain in order to
account for such content’s meaning are de re – properties of the objects denoted by it – or
de  dicto –  properties  of  the  descriptions  that  we  associate  to  it?  In  the  case  of  a
counterpossible,  one  promising  way  to  answer  the  question  consists  in  understanding
whether it figures in the explanation of some non-representational phenomenon. If that is
the  case,  provided  that  it  cannot  be  paraphrased  away  or  substituted  with  a  non-
hyperintensional statement with equal epistemic worth, the most natural way of reading it is
de re. And this is precisely what happens with the case studies discussed above. If ordinary
counterfactual  modality  can  be  a  de  re feature  of  the  world,  the  same  is  true  of
counterpossible modality, provided that certain conditions (which are ultimately epistemic
in nature) are satisfied.
In the present work I primarily focused on scientific practice for its strong degree of
commitment to an accurate account of reality, which is typically more acceptable than that
of metaphysical theories. But this does not entail that examples from metaphysics should be
ruled out from a rigorous understanding of worldly hyperintensionality. This is why my two
criteria  have been presented only as  sufficient conditions.  However,  one might  want  to
extend this notion to the metaphysical cases too (as Nolan assumes), therefore it should be
possible to loosen the indispensability criterion for accommodating them. We might sketch
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the new general criteria for counterpossibles to be worldly hyperintensional (i.e. capturing
a relation of counterpossible dependence between objects), this time jointly necessary and
sufficient, as follows:
(I) Indispensability: if they are required in order to explain a phenomenon.
(II)  Reality: if they have a metaphysically impossible antecedent with a non-
representational subject matter.
This version of the indispensability criterion allows also for counterpossibles that feature in
metaphysical  explanations  to  be  worldly  hyperintensional.  For  instance,  it  allows  to
consider an intuitive case of worldly hyperintensionality like that of impossible dispositions
(see  section  2.2)  as  a  genuine  worldly  hyperintensional  phenomenon,  since  impossible
dispositions are typically explained by means of counterpossibles that satisfy the reality
criterion31.
Finally,  in  section  3.5  I  suggested  a  possible  reading  of  the  counterpossible
dependence relation by appealing to a theory states of affairs, in order to account for the
non-representational nature of the relata.  In particular, I adopted Barker and Jago's theory
of negative facts for the cases in which the relation is ascribed between absences (as in the
case of relative computability) or ways things are  not  (as in the case of the molecular
structure of isomers).
In conclusion,  what has been discussed in the present work, especially for what
concerns the brief incursion in metaphysics of the very last part, leaves room to a number
of further issues that are worthy to be explored. With respect to the problem of the source of
hyperintensionality,  one can ask whether it  is possible to find some general criteria for
identifying  any  case  of  worldly  hyperintensionality,  even  if  it  is  not  captured  by  a
counterpossible, and in turn whether the appeal to a fact-based picture would be appropriate
in  any  such  circumstance.  On  the  semantic  side,  we  might  find  some  approaches  for
accounting cases of worldly hyperintensionality more appealing than others  (for instance a
truthmaker-based approach instead of one that relies on impossible worlds or structured
propositions32). These and other related questions shall be discussed elsewhere. For the time
31 See Jenkins and Nolan 2012.
32 See Fine 2017.
58
being, I want to conclude my case in support of worldly hyperintensionality with the words
of one of its most distinguished opponents, Timothy Williamson, that in assessing the limits
of the conceptual turn in philosophy writes:
The practitioners of any discipline have thoughts and communicate them, but they are
rarely studying those very thoughts: rather, they are studying what their thoughts are
about. Most thoughts are not about thoughts. To make philosophy the study of thought
is to insist that philosophers’ thoughts should be about thoughts. It is not obvious why
philosophers should accept that restriction [...] Much contemporary metaphysics is not
primarily  concerned  with  thought  or  language  at  all.  Its  goal  is  to  discover  what
fundamental kinds of things there are and what properties and relations they have, not
to study the structure of our thought about them. (pp. 17-19).
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